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CRIMINALIZING BATTERED MOTHERS
Courtney Cross*
Abstract
How a domestic violence survivor responds to the abuse she is
experiencing depends on many factors. Some critical considerations
include her access to resources, desire to stay in her relationship, and
assessment of her own safety. Criminal and civil court systems place
enormous pressure on survivors to separate from their abusive partners.
Not only are survivors with children pressured to leave, they are punished
when they stay. That punishment can come in any combination of
diminished custody rights, limited parental rights, and incarceration. Yet
a survivor who flees with her children is not immune to these same
consequences: if she leaves in a manner that is not state sanctioned, she
may be punished criminally or civilly for kidnapping her children,
regardless of the violence she was experiencing at home.
Criminal parental kidnapping charges can cost a survivor her
liberty, safety, and relationship with her children. While some state
statutes attempt to address the potential for flight from domestic violence,
many do not acknowledge the intersection between parental kidnapping
and domestic violence at all and none provide sufficient safeguards for
battered parents. Survivors are caught in a double bind in which the state
can both pressure them to leave abusive relationships and also punish
them for the manner in which they do so. A survivor who does not incur
criminal parental kidnapping charges may still be negatively impacted by
her decision to leave in both the child welfare system and domestic
relations court.
Large scale systemic change is necessary to truly enhance survivors’
independence. In addition to amending parental kidnapping laws to
adequately anticipate and respond to safety seeking defendants, individual
attorneys and the larger domestic violence movement must become more
willing and better prepared to advocate for all survivors across and
outside of the legal system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal laws punishing parents for kidnapping their own children are largely
conceived as existing to prevent a disgruntled parent from acting out of spite to
punish the children’s other parent.1 Frequent news stories and AMBER Alerts often
describe parents on the run, refusing to obey custody orders issued against them.2
But parental kidnapping laws, also known as custodial interference statutes, cast a
wider net than these stories might imply. It is not just vindictive, scheming parents
who risk arrest and conviction when they deny access to their children. Survivors of
domestic violence can also find themselves enmeshed in criminal proceedings for
fleeing with their children. Although parental kidnapping laws vary greatly among
the fifty states and Washington, D.C.,3 none of them adequately anticipate domestic
violence or provide the protections needed when survivors of domestic violence
escape with their children.
It is not surprising that parental kidnapping occurs in the context of abusive
relationships: it is important to note, however, that departures with the children by
either the abusive parent or the survivor may be considered parental kidnapping.4

1

See, e.g., People v. Olsewski, 630 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Ill. App. 1994) (“The statute was
primarily intended to prevent disgruntled parents who were unsuccessful in their attempts to
obtain custody through legal channels from seeking self-help by spiriting the children away
to another jurisdiction in violation of a custody order.”).
2
See, e.g., Dallas Franklin, Authorities Locate Oklahoma Mother Who Allegedly
Abducted 2 Boys, NBC KFOR.COM (Aug. 9, 2016, 9:22 AM), http://kfor.com/2016/08/09/
authorities-searching-for-oklahoma-boys-who-were-allegedly-abducted-by-non-custodialparent/ [https://perma.cc/WU3V-ESJM] (detailing the safe return of two children abducted
by their noncustodial mother); Mother Who Allegedly Abducted Her 6-Week-Old Baby
Extradited to Virginia Jail, ABC WJLA (Aug. 2, 2016), http://wjla.com/news/crime/motherwho-abducted-her-6-week-old-baby-extradited-to-virginia-jail
[https://perma.cc/B2C476AK] (noting that Child and Family Services had an order to remove the child from her
mother’s care when the child was discovered missing); Jesse Paul, Fort Collins Police Say
Parental Kidnapping Prompted Amber Alert for 5-Year-Old Girl, THE DENVER POST (Aug.
12, 2016, 5:21 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/08/12/amber-alert-five-year-old-girlfort-collins/ [https://perma.cc/NBL6-NYXA] (describing a mother evading a court order to
relinquish custody); Nicole Perez, 3-Year-Old Girl Found Safe After Amber Alert,
ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (Aug. 2, 2016, 8:48 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/819018/3year-old-abducted-from-santa-rosa.html [https://perma.cc/7SBG-9TBA] (reporting on the
safe return of a child after being kidnapped by her mother in violation of a custody order). It
is interesting to note the prevalence of news stories regarding children abducted by their
mother.
3
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN, THE IMPACT
OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING LAWS AND PRACTICE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 11–
13 (2005) [hereinafter NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE].
4
Id. at 1.

2018]

CRIMINALIZING BATTERED MOTHERS

261

The difference in motivation between a survivor seeking safety with her children5
and an abusive partner asserting control and dominance is of critical importance,
especially given that research has demonstrated a strong relationship between
domestic violence and parental kidnapping.6 Yet in an extensive report on parental
kidnapping, the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women
(“NCDBW”) posited that “[d]espite the dramatic difference between these two
acts—one vindictive and the other protective—the criminal justice system rarely
considers the contexts of abductions.”7
There is also a gendered component to parental kidnapping prosecutions.
Although most children abducted by a relative are abducted by their biological

5

This Article intentionally presumes that the survivors being discussed herein are both
women and mothers, though it does not also presume that the abusive partners are men.
While men can be abused in relationships by both women and men, this Article is specifically
exploring the intersection between motherhood and survivorship in the context of defending
against parental kidnapping charges in criminal court. Moreover, women are more likely to
be on the receiving end of the kind of extensive intimate terrorism, coercive control, and
battering that might prompt the need to suddenly and secretly break off all ties with an
abusive partner. See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED
WOMEN: A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND
JUSTICE 8–12 (Am. Psychol. Ass’n 2008) (discussing domestic violence typologies and the
increased likelihood of women to be the victims of intimate terrorism as opposed to the more
equally distributed situational couple violence); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 38–40 (N.Y.U. Press 2012).
6
See, e.g., JANET CHIANCONE ET AL., A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, ISSUES
IN RESOLVING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION BY PARENTS 15 (1998) (finding
that 60% of abducting parents had previously threatened the life of the nonabducting parent
in the past); GEOFFREY L. GREIF & REBECCA L. HEGAR, WHEN PARENTS KIDNAP: THE
FAMILIES BEHIND THE HEADLINES 36 (1993) (finding that domestic violence “was present in
54% of the couples in [the] sample, with the abductor reportedly the only violent partner
90% of the time”); JANET R. JOHNSTON ET AL., EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF RISK FACTORS
FOR PARENTAL ABDUCTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN 5 (2001) (reporting “high incident
rates of domestic violence” in families that experienced parental kidnapping); Janet R.
Johnston & Samantha K. Hamilton, Parental Abduction, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 523, 524 (Nicky Ali Jackson ed., 2007) (describing how “[d]omestic violence and
substance abuse—more often perpetrated by the male partner—are alleged to have occurred
in two-thirds to three-quarters of families where children are subsequently abducted by a
parent. In the majority of these cases there is some evidence to back up these claims”);
Monique C. Boudreaux et al., Child Abduction: An Overview of Current and Historical
Perspectives, 5 CHILD MALTREATMENT 63, 66 (Feb. 2000) (noting the correlation between
domestic violence and parental kidnapping); Leslie Ellen Shear & Julia C. Shear Kushner,
Taking and Keeping the Children: Family Abduction Risk and Remedies in U.S. Family
Courts, 10 J. CHILD CUSTODY 252, 272 (2013) (noting that “many families that experience
abduction have experienced domestic violence”).
7
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 1.
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father,8 mothers are more likely to be convicted and incarcerated for parental
kidnapping than fathers.9 This is true even though multiple researchers have found
that mothers abducting their children were likely seeking safety from abuse while
fathers were committing the abduction as part of a larger pattern of exerting power
and control over the mother.10
The harm that stems from the failure to distinguish between abusers and safety
seekers is exacerbated by the ways in which the state—through both civil and legal
systems—pressures survivors in abusive relationships into separating from their
partners.11 Not only do many judges insist that it is the survivor’s responsibility to
leave a violent relationship,12 they also assume she is prepared to make and maintain
that choice, and that doing so is in her and her children’s best interest.13 In fact, many
survivors make decisions to stay or leave specifically in light of how each decision
might impact their children’s safety.14 If, however, a survivor rationally decides not
to leave her abusive partner in order to protect her children, she risks being punished
for this decision by incarceration, termination of parental rights, or loss of custody.
On the other hand, if she chooses to separate on her own accord or bows to systemic
pressure to do so, her departure with the children—if it meets the statutory

8

HEATHER HAMMER ET AL., CHILDREN ABDUCTED BY FAMILY MEMBERS: NATIONAL
ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS, NAT’L INCIDENCE STUD. OF MISSING, ABDUCTED,
RUNAWAY, AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN 4 (2002) (stating that 53% of family abductions
are committed by biological fathers and 25% by biological mothers).
9
JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
10
Johnston & Hamilton, supra note 6, at 524 (noting that it is usually fathers who
kidnap children as part of a campaign of domestic violence whereas it is usually mothers
who flee to protect their children ); see also Janet R. Johnston & Linda K. Girdner, Early
Identification of Parents at Risk for Custody Violations and Prevention of Child Abductions,
36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 392, 404 (1998) (describing the fathers’ acts of
kidnapping as a tactic of domestic violence against the other parent).
11
Rona Kaufman Kitchen, Constrained Choice: Mothers, the State, and Domestic
Violence, 24 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 375, 383–84 (2015) (“[S]tates have passed laws
that punish women if they fail to leave an abusive relationship through state-sanctioned
routes.”).
12
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1991) (discussing how legal actors assume it is the
survivor’s responsibility to leave abusive relationships regardless of emotional attachments).
13
Mahoney, supra note 12, at 61 (describing “several assumptions about separation:
that the right solution is separation, that it is the woman’s responsibility to achieve
separation, and that she could have separated”); see also Rana Fuller, How to Effectively
Advocate for Battered Women When Systems Fail, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 939, 940
(2007) (confirming that society tells survivors that leaving is always the right choice and
often a mandatory choice).
14
Simon Lapierre, More Responsibilities, Less Control: Understanding the Challenges
and Difficulties Involved in Mothering in the Context of Domestic Violence, 40 BRIT. J. SOC.
WORK 1434, 1442 (2010).
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definitions of parental kidnapping—may also risk exposing her to incarceration,
termination of parental rights, or loss of custody.
Parental kidnapping charges are not solely triggered when a parent takes her
children out of state or out of the country.15 Even a parent who remains in the same
city or jurisdiction as the other parent is not immune from a parental kidnapping
claim. For survivors considering leaving unsafe relationships, their decision about
where to relocate will often be grounded in considerations of safety and stability
rather than jurisdictional concerns.16 For some survivors, the threat of separation
violence may mandate that they leave their current home and, in so doing, leave very
little trace of where they have gone for fear of being followed, stalked, or attacked.17
Other survivors may need to stay in their communities to avoid disrupting
employment, childcare, schooling, family relationships, or benefits. Research has
demonstrated that domestic violence survivors are capable of understanding and
predicting the unique risks they face in both staying in and leaving their
relationships.18 Yet in punishing survivors for making decisions that are not
sanctioned by the state, their experiences and insights are being devalued.19
Moreover, little government or private funding is available to help domestic violence
survivors access resources that would help them develop a state sanctioned plan for
separation.20
Survivors in violent relationships have to navigate a multisystem legal
labyrinth: stay and risk state intrusion or leave and risk even more.21 This Article
15

Catherine F. Klein et al., Border Crossings: Understanding the Civil, Criminal, and
Immigration Implications for Battered Women Fleeing Across State Lines with Their
Children, 39 FAM. L.Q. 109, 119 (2005).
16
See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 2 (“[A] parent who is a domestic
violence survivor may need to relocate for safety”); Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110 (“The
decision to flee the state may mean an opportunity to live with extended family members
who will offer a survivor and her children a safe, caring, supportive, and familiar
environment.”).
17
Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110.
18
See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact
of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 531 (2010)
(synthesizing the findings of research on these women’s ability to predict their own risk).
19
Kitchen, supra note 11, at 376 (articulating the tension between survivors acting in
accordance with the state versus taking action into their own hands).
20
Deborah M. Weissman, Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of
Domestic Violence, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 221, 222 (2013) (discussing funding
priorities in the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act); see also Kitchen,
supra note 11, at 376–77 (describing the constrained choices survivors have when pressured
to leave without being provided with resources to support separation).
21
Kitchen, supra note 11, at 385 (discussing the “inhospitable legal labyrinth” that
survivors encounter when they do try to seek safety through separation). See also LORRAINE
RADFORD & MARIANNE HESTER, MOTHERING THROUGH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 142 (2006)
(describing the “three planets” battered mothers must navigate: the domestic violence
system, the domestic relations system, and the child welfare system).
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analyzes how the state constrains battered mothers’ choices and criminalizes many
of their options, focusing on those survivors who flee with their children.22 Part II
begins by exploring the myriad ways both civil and criminal court systems pressure
survivors to leave violent relationships despite the very real danger of separation
violence. Part III analyzes state parental kidnapping laws and related federal laws,
discusses how battered mothers may fall within their scope, and emphasizes the
extreme variations in states’ application of parental kidnapping laws on survivors of
violence. Part IV examines the risks mothers face after making the choice to separate
while recognizing that this choice may be state imposed. Part V concludes by
providing recommendations for lawyers working with separating survivors,
suggestions for amending state parental kidnapping statutes’ language, and
proposals for expanding the domestic violence movement’s activism to include a
more intersectional framework that would benefit survivors, their families, and their
communities.
II. STATE PRESSURE TO LEAVE
There are several ways in which civil and criminal legal systems pressure
domestic violence survivors into leaving their abusive partners: they must leave their
abusive partners if they want to either invoke state assistance23 or avoid unwanted
state intervention.24 This pressure to separate permeates many practices now
considered routine, including law enforcement officers executing mandatory arrest
and no drop prosecution policies;25 prosecutors including stay away orders in both

22
This Article’s scope is limited to survivors who flee within the United States, as this
phenomenon has received less scholarly attention and may be more feasible for many
survivors. This is meant not to diminish the experiences of survivors who flee outside of the
United States. For comprehensive discussions of survivors escaping from domestic violence
with their children by fleeing internationally, see Julia Alanen, When Human Rights Conflict:
Mediating International Parental Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence
Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 49 (2008); Susan Kreston, Prosecuting
International Parental Kidnapping, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 533 (2001);
Brian Quillen, The New Face of International Child Abduction: Domestic-Violence Victims
and Their Treatment Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, 49 TEX. INT’L L. J. 621 (2014); Merle H. Weiner, International Child
Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593 (2000).
23
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 19; ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 77 (2000); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered
Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009,
1018 (2000).
24
Kitchen, supra note 11, at 385–86.
25
G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 245–46, 265
(2005).
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pre and posttrial conditions of release;26 judges denying survivors’ requests to vacate
civil protection orders;27 abusive partners being granted custody of the children in
family court;28 and survivors being charged with failing to protect their children.29
Despite being pressured to separate and punished for staying, there are many
reasons why survivors may not leave their abusive partners, including love, logistics,
economic dependence, social and psychological isolation, pressure from family or
friends, or fear of separation violence.30 Yet most legal systems ignore survivors’
agency and insight and instead focus on separation-based remedies.31
A. Mandatory Arrest and No Drop Prosecution Policies
In the last thirty years, nearly all states and the District of Columbia adopted
mandatory arrest policies in response to local law enforcement’s consistent failure
to arrest batterers.32 These policies make it mandatory for officers to arrest if there
is probable cause to believe that domestic violence has occurred. 33 While many saw
this as a step toward taking domestic violence seriously,34 there is doubt about these
policies’ effectiveness35 and debate over their fairness.36 Much has been written
26
Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 56–60 (2006). Suk notes
that “state-imposed de facto divorce is so class-contingent that it could be called poor man’s
divorce.” Id. at 59.
27
Johnson, supra note 18, at 562–63.
28
Kitchen, supra note 11, at 397.
29
See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know that for Sure?:
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 223 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 7, 21–22 (2004).
30
See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 77; Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and
Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 191, 201–02 (2008); Tamara L. Kuennen, Love Matters, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 990
(2014); Jody Raphael, Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC.
POL’Y, & L. 367, 371–73 (2002).
31
GOODMARK, supra note 5, at 9–10; Johnson, supra note 18, at 526; Kitchen, supra
note 11, at 386 n.75.
32
Miccio, supra note 25, at 240 n.2; Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 741, 757–58 (2007).
33
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859–60 (1996); Miccio, supra note 25, at
265.
34
Miccio, supra note 25, at 265.
35
See, e.g., Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic
Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 824–25 (2001); Sue Osthoff,
But, Gertrude, I Beg to Differ, a Hit Is Not a Hit Is Not a Hit: When Battered Women Are
Arrested for Assaulting Their Partners, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1521, 1451 n.11
(2002).
36
Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground”
Between Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427, 431 (2003) (observing that “[t]he negative impacts on
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about their negative impact on marginalized survivors, from increasing the
likelihood of arrest37 to undermining autonomy.38
Regardless of these consequences, however, mandatory arrest policies were
designed to ensure that batterers were swiftly removed from the situation and held
accountable for their actions.39 They reflect the belief that neither police nor
survivors should have discretion when it comes to deciding how to respond to
domestic violence.40 Even if a survivor did not call the police and even if she does
not wish to see her partner arrested, she has no say in whether he is arrested: she and
her partner will be separated in the interest of keeping her safe. While many
survivors reasonably believe that arresting their partners will expose them to more
violence at the hands of their partners and law enforcement,41 this concern is
overridden by the state’s desire to separate the parties to immediately remove the
threat.42
Both before and after the adoption of mandatory arrest policies, very few
domestic violence cases were prosecuted.43 The influx of arrests due to mandatory
arrest policies did not result in a significantly increased number of prosecutions
because prosecutors were under resourced and unmotivated to pursue a case if a
victim expressed ambivalence or doubt about moving forward with the case.44
communities of color, of all classes, and on poor people, of all ethnicities, were entirely
predictable many years ago. Racial disparities were already well established throughout the
criminal justice system at the time battered women’s advocates started working for more
reliance on the system. They are starker now.”).
37
Ellen L. Pence & Melanie F. Shepard, An Introduction: Developing a Coordinated
Community Response, in COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
LESSONS FROM DULUTH AND BEYOND 3, 7 (Melanie F. Shepard & Ellen L. Pence, eds.,
1999); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1043 (2000); Gruber, supra note 32, at
813; Myrna S. Raeder, Preserving Family Ties for Domestic Violence Survivors and Their
Children by Invoking a Human Rights Approach to Avoid the Criminalization of Mothers
Based on the Acts and Accusations of Their Batterers, 17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 105, 110–
11 (2014); Andrea J. Richie, Law Enforcement Violence Against Women of Color, in THE
COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY 138, 140 (INCITE! Women of Color
Against Violence ed. 2016).
38
Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009); Tamara L.
Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence Victims: How Much Is
Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 6 (2013); Miccio, supra note 25, at 293–
94.
39
See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case
but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 215 (2008).
40
Goodmark, supra note 38, at 3–4.
41
Coker, supra note 37, at 1042.
42
See Johnson, supra note 18, at 551.
43
EPSTEIN & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 73.
44
Kohn, supra note 39, at 222–23.
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Activists in the movement saw this as a reflection of the state’s lack of interest in
holding batterers accountable.45 To combat this apathy, they advocated for the
adoption of various no drop prosecution policies, including hard no drop policies
which require prosecutors to prosecute cases regardless of the complaining witness’
wishes or concerns; and soft no drop polices, which encourage prosecutors to stay
the course and provide some resources to keep victims involved.46 These policies
became the domestic violence movement’s method of both ensuring that batterers
were not just arrested but brought to justice and sending a message to the public that
domestic violence was condemned by the state.47
No drop prosecution policies reflect the mainstream beliefs that the legal
system is the most effective way to address domestic violence and that the best way
for the legal system to combat domestic violence is through keeping the parties
apart.48 This commitment to legal intervention overlooks the reality that arrest and
criminal prosecution may actually expose survivors to potential anger, violence, and
isolation from the defendant.49 When survivors resist this one size fits all model,
however, they are seen as either helpless and unable to think for themselves50 or
lying schemers with questionable agendas.51 Survivors thus do not have a choice
about whether to separate from or stay with their abusive partners once law
enforcement gets involved: the decision to separate has been made for them by the
criminal system.
B. Criminal Stay Away Orders
Once a defendant has been arraigned on criminal domestic violence charges, it
is common for prosecutors to request conditions of release if the defendant is not
going to be detained pending trial.52 In domestic violence cases, it is especially
routine for prosecutors to request that the defendant stay away from and have no
contact with the complaining witness.53 This means that the defendant could be
arrested and charged with a new crime—that of violating the conditions of his
release—if he is found to have texted, visited, or returned to living with his partner.54
Law professor Jeannie Suk refers to this practice as “state-imposed de facto divorce”
and has opined on how criminal law is increasingly devoted to intervening in and
restructuring family life for justice-involved individuals and their partners.55
45

EPSTEIN & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 37; See also Goodmark, supra note 38, at 12.
Goodmark, supra note 38, at 12–13; Miccio, supra note 25, at 266–67.
47
Miccio, supra note 25, at 265–67.
48
Goodmark, supra note 29, at 8.
49
EPSTEIN & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 76.
50
Goodmark, supra note 29, at 20; Miccio, supra note 25, at 241.
51
Kohn, supra note 39, at 202.
52
Suk, supra note 26, at 16.
53
Id. at 8.
54
Id. at 21.
55
Id. at 8.
46
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For a survivor who did not want law enforcement involvement to disrupt or
determine the fate of her relationship, finding out that her partner is legally
prohibited from interacting with her can have far reaching emotional56 and economic
consequences.57 The most immediate consequences of involving the criminal justice
system in the lives of a survivor are her inability to share a home with, communicate
with, or even see her partner. In addition, for defendants who blame their partners
for the arrest or prosecution, involvement in the criminal justice system may also
cause them to stop providing economic or emotional support—a choice they may
not have made but for intervention by the criminal legal system.
A survivor cannot just opt out of participating in the criminal process, however.
Prosecutors typically subpoena survivors to testify at trial: if a subpoenaed survivor
does not come to the court date, prosecutors can and do request bench warrants
against her and move to hold her in contempt of court, which can result in
incarceration.58
C. Civil Protection Orders
Survivors who do not want to engage with the criminal legal system and
manage to evade its reach may nonetheless choose to obtain a civil protection order.
While not a criminal proceeding per se,59 these civil injunctions can place onerous
restrictions on the opposing party, including eviction from a shared home,
requirements not to contact or come near the survivor, and mandatory counseling or
treatment—often at the opposing party’s expense.60 While survivors petitioning for
a protection order often select which conditions they wish to have imposed, it is not
unheard of for judges to include unrequested requirements in the final order. A
violation of any of the provisions included in a civil protection order can result in a
56

For an example of a complaining witness struggling with a stay away order, see Aya
Gruber, supra note 32, at 743 (describing an interaction with a complaining witness: “Britney
tells me that she only called the police ‘cause I was mad and wanted him out of the house.’
She does not want to pursue charges against Jamal and adamantly refuses to comply with
any no-contact order. Then, in a more hushed tone, she asks, ‘What if I just leave now and
don’t show up later—will they drop the case?’”).
57
Suk, supra note 26, at 57.
58
Jane K. Stoever, Parental Abduction and the State Intervention Paradox, 92 WASH.
L. REV. 861, 870–71 (2017). See also Alex Barber, Prosecutor Orders Arrest of Woman as
Material Witness to Testify Against Her Alleged Abuser, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Sept. 20,
2013, 9:03 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/09/20/news/state/prosecutor-ordersarrest-of-woman-as-material-witness-to-testify-against-her-alleged-abuser/ [https://perma.
cc/5FTU-ES8P]; Jodie Fleischer, Innocent Victim Speaks Out About Being Jailed for 17
Days, WSB-TV 2 ATLANTA (May 1, 2012, 8:50 PM), http://www.wsbtv.com/news/innocentvictim-speaks-out-about-being-jailed-17-d/242355608 [https://perma.cc/A4U9-S2QG].
59
Many scholars have noted the “quasi-criminal” nature of the civil protection order.
See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1142–50 (2009).
60
Id. at 1111.

2018]

CRIMINALIZING BATTERED MOTHERS

269

criminal prosecution, similar to the violation of a criminal stay away order.61 These
remedies can benefit a survivor who is able to conceive of how she wants to limit
her relationship with her partner for a year—or, in many jurisdictions, indefinitely.62
Some survivors who obtain a civil protection order may find that, for various
reasons, it is not helping them achieve their goals—for example, providing childcare
to children, benefiting from a joint income, or reconciling with their partner.
Protection order beneficiaries who seek to vacate their order are not always able to
do so.63 Unlike other civil contexts where plaintiffs are able to dismiss no longer
desired court orders, survivors are often forced to convince judges to permit them to
modify or vacate their orders.64 It is not uncommon for judges to push back on
survivors’ requests, or even deny them entirely, refusing to vacate the protection
order.65 Rather than listen to a litigant’s own expression of agency and desire, judges
may substitute their values and beliefs about what a survivor needs or how she
should live her life.66 As a result, when a motion to vacate is denied, a survivor and
her partner must either comply with the court imposed separation or risk the criminal
consequences of being in violation of the order.67
D. Custody Determinations
Given the frequency with which abusive parents request and are granted
custody in family court cases,68 survivors may choose to stay in abusive relationships
to maintain access to their children.69 Yet this decision may prove detrimental if
either parent decides to seek custody of the children either independently or as part
of a larger dissolution of marriage case. A survivor who claims domestic violence
or child abuse in a family court setting but did not leave the relationship may be seen
61

KATHLEEN J. FERRARO, NEITHER ANGELS NOR DEMONS: WOMEN, CRIME, AND
VICTIMIZATION 97 (2006).
62
For information on the length of a protection order in any state, consult the appendix
included in Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence
Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1093 (2014).
63
See Johnson, supra note 59, at 1149; Kohn, supra note 39, at 233–34.
64
See Johnson, supra note 59, at 1149; Kohn, supra note 39, at 233–34.
65
See Johnson, supra note 59, at 1149; Kohn, supra note 39, at 233–34.
66
GOODMAN & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 81.
67
While it is typically the respondent who faces criminal charges for violating a
protection order, some judges have threatened to hold victims in contempt as well. Kohn,
supra note 39, at 230.
68
Stoever, supra note 58, at 906; Joan S. Meier, Rates at Which Accused and
Adjudicated Batterers Receive Sole or Joint Custody, DVLEAP.ORG (2013), https://drive.
google.com/file/d/1hZvruA9pzaH1lEgX0JqRmEdW50ucwALQ/view [https://perma.cc/BA
96-P7XG] (citing multiple studies that find abusive fathers contest custody twice as often as
nonabusive fathers and receive custody in more than half of custody cases where abuse is
alleged).
69
Kitchen, supra note 11, at 396.
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as fabricating the abuse in order to gain an advantage in the custody proceedings,70
which strongly undermines the survivor’s credibility and perceived motives in the
eyes of a judge untrained or uninterested in the dynamics of domestic violence.71
Survivors requesting that the other parent receive limited or no access to the children
may also be viewed as uncooperative,72 which can be seen as a fatal flaw in states
that have adopted “friendly parenting” statutes that emphasize the importance of
supportive coparenting.73 A survivor who does not take the steps the family court
judge deems necessary for collaborative coparenting may be seen as not acting in
the child’s best interest—even if those choices have been mandated by other court
systems.74 Survivors who stay in abusive relationships may struggle to be seen by
the court as good mothers or credible witnesses: these impressions will undermine
their testimony and their attempts to obtain substantial parenting time and significant
decisionmaking abilities.
E. Failure-to-Protect Charges
Survivors who remain in unsafe relationships risk being charged with failing to
protect their children by exposing their children to domestic violence or child abuse:
these charges may occur through criminal prosecution, through the child welfare
system, or both.75 Either proceeding can have devastating effects on survivors,
ranging from loss of liberty to loss of parental rights.

70

Raeder, supra note 37, at 120 (observing that courts may see survivors’ claims of
child abuse in the custody setting as merely “a litigation tactic”).
71
Id. at 119 (noting that “commentators consider that judges tend to disbelieve women
who are victims of domestic violence, whether from stereotypical gender biased views or
because they believe these women make bad choices that disregard the best interests of their
children.”); see also Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional
Statutes to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence After the Violence Against Women Act of
2000, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101, 167 (2004) (citing “misconceptions about domestic
violence” and a tendency to believe that women “lie about abuse” as an explanation of why
survivors struggle to obtain custody of their children).
72
Kitchen, supra note 11, at 397.
73
Kitchen, supra note 11, at 397.
74
Margo Lindauer, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Why Multi-CourtInvolved Battered Mothers Just Can’t Win, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 797, 799
(2012) (discussing how even women who fully comply with orders and expectations placed
on them by other involved courts may be negatively judged by family court judges who value
coparenting over separation); Klein et al., supra note 15, at 132–33 (discussing how “friendly
parenting” provisions and philosophies in custody cases can harm survivors who prioritize
safety over coparenting); Goodmark, supra note 29, at 27–28 (also arguing that friendly
parenting policies unfairly impact survivors who are custody litigants).
75
See, e.g., Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of
Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 567 (2004); Raeder,
supra note 37, at 110–11.
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Even if the child or children are not being abused themselves, the survivor may
nonetheless be criminally charged with failure to protect the children because she
allowed them to be exposed to her own abuse.76 These charges presuppose both that
the harm to children directly or indirectly witnessing domestic violence is severe
and also that this harm is the result of the survivor’s inability to protect the children,
thus rendering her a bad mother.77 These charges fall under the often overlapping
categories of child endangerment or neglect,78 which, in some states, includes
impacting the child’s welfare rather than just the child’s physical safety.79
76

See, e.g., Lindauer, supra note 74, at 798; Kitchen, supra note 11, at 383–85. Some
scholars have suggested that more exposure to domestic violence charges have been filed
criminally since the Nicholson case in New York curtailed the use of exposure to domestic
violence as a rationale for removing children from their homes through the child welfare
system. Nicholson v. Williams, No. 00 CV 2229 JBW, 2004 WL 4780498 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
5, 2004); see, e.g., David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of
Protection and Their Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1460 (2010).
77
See Dorothy Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 97–98, 116–18
(1993).
78
See Raeder, supra note 37, at 383 n.66.
79
Many states have statutes written broadly enough to include impact on the child’s
mental or emotional welfare. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-206(a)(1) (2006) (defining
endangering the welfare of a minor in the second degree); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-207(a)(1)
(2006) (defining endangering the welfare of a minor in the third degree); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 273a (1997) (prohibiting willful harm or injury to child, including endangering person or
health); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (2014) (prohibiting child abuse); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-21 (2015) (prohibiting injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of, children); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1102, 1102(a)(1)(a) (2017) (prohibiting endangering the welfare of a
child); IDAHO CODE § 18-1501 (2005) (prohibiting injury to children); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/12C-5 (2013) (prohibiting endangering the life or health of a child); IND. CODE § 35-46-14 (2017) (prohibiting neglect of a dependent); IOWA CODE § 726.6(1)(e) (2017) (recognizing
domestic violence as an affirmative dense if the defendant had a reasonable fear of serious
bodily harm); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5601 (2011) (prohibiting endangering a child); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-602.1 (2011) (prohibiting neglect of a minor); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.378 (2005) (prohibiting neglect or endangerment of a child); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 568.045 (2017) (prohibiting first degree child endangerment); MO. REV. STAT. § 68.050
(2017) (prohibiting second degree child endangerment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-622
(2007) (prohibiting endangering the welfare of children); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-707(1)(a)
(2015) (prohibiting child abuse); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508 (2015) (prohibiting neglect or
endangerment of a child); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3(I) (2016) (prohibiting endangering
the welfare of a child); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1(b) (1987) (prohibiting abuse, abandonment,
cruelty, and neglect of a child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(D)(1) (2009) (prohibiting the
abandonment or abuse of a child); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(1) (2010) (prohibiting
endangering the welfare of a child); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-22(1) (1957) (prohibiting
child abuse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (2011) (prohibiting endangering children);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 843.5 (2014) (prohibiting child abuse); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-70
(2008) (prohibiting unlawful conduct toward a child); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(2)
(2017) (prohibiting injury to a child and recognizing a very specific domestic violence

272

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

Survivors are especially in danger of being criminally charged with failing to
protect their children if their children also experience abuse. Many states define child
endangerment to include allowing or enabling abuse of the children.80 These charges
defense); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1304 (1971) (prohibiting cruelty to a child and
recognizing a domestic violence affirmative defense); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (2016)
(prohibiting abuse and neglect of children); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-403 (1977) (prohibiting
abandoning or endangering children). Note that the breadth of these statutes indicates the
possibility of these charges being brought for exposing a child to domestic violence even if
these states have not pursued this option.
80
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.100(a)(3) (2013) (prohibiting leaving a child with
another person when the defendant knows the person has previously mistreated the child);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623(A)(1) (2009) (prohibiting intentional or knowing child
abuse); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-221(a) (2003) (prohibiting the reckless permission of abuse
of a minor and recognizing an affirmative defense for taking remedial measures to end the
abuse); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (1997) (prohibiting willful harm or injury to child); COLO
REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (2014) (prohibiting permitting a child to be placed in an abusive
situation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1102, 1102(a)(1)(b) (2017) (prohibiting endangering
the welfare of a child); FLA. STAT. § 827.03(1)(b)(3) (2017) (prohibiting “active
encouragement” of child abuse); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-903.5(1)(a) (2008) (prohiting
intentionally or knowingly allowing another person to abuse a child); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 709-904(1)(a) (2008) (prohibiting recklessly allowing another person to abuse a child and
recognizing a domestic violence affirmative defense); IDAHO CODE § 18-1501 (2005)
(prohibiting permitting a child to suffer); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12C-5(a) (2013)
(prohibiting permitting the endangerment of a child); IOWA CODE § 726.6(e) (2017)
(prohibiting permitting the abuse of a child and recognizing a domestic violence affirmative
defense); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5601 (2011) (prohibiting causing or permitting the
endangerment of a child); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.100, 508.110, 508.120 (1982)
(prohitbing permitting abuse when the defendant has actual custody of the child); ME. STAT.
tit. 17-A, § 554)(B-2) (2015) (prohibiting recklessly failing to protect child from harm);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 13J (2010) (prohibiting conduct that creates a substantial risk
of injury or sexual abuse to a child); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.136b(3)–(7) (2017)
(prohibiting failure to act causing harm to a child and recognizing a domestic violence
affirmative defense); MINN. STAT. § 609.378(b)(1) (2005) (prohibiting permitting a child to
be placed in a situation likely to substantially harm that child and recognizing a domestic
violence affirmative defense); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-40(1) (1992) (prohibiting knowingly
condoning felonious abuse—must be more than not reporting); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5628(1)(b) (2013) (prohibiting placing a child in the physical custody of someone who the
defendant knows has previously injured the child); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-707(1) (2015)
(prohibiting permitting child abuse); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508(2) (2015) (prohibiting
permitting child to suffer); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3(I) (2016) (prohibiting violating a
duty to protect); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1(d) (1987) (prohibiting willful omission causing
unnecessary pain or suffering); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(D) (2009) (prohibiting permitting
abuse of child); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2(a) (2009) (prohibiting allowing injury to be
inflicted on child); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-22(1) (2015) (prohibiting allowing abuse of
child); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.15(B) (2009) (recognizing an affirmative defense for
when defendant could not prevent the harm and took steps to get help); OKLA STAT. tit. 21,
§ 852.1(A)(1) (2011) (prohibiting knowingly permitting physical or sexual abuse); OKLA
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also presume that it is the survivor’s responsibility to prevent abuse: while the
abusive parent may also be charged with child abuse, the brunt of criminal charges
related to children often falls on mothers, who are typically seen as responsible for
protecting their children at any cost.81 Even when the survivor herself has been
abused by the child’s abuser, she may still receive a substantial sentence for not
intervening.82
STAT. tit. 21, § 843.5(B) (2014) (prohibiting enabling child abuse); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 4304(a)(1) (2017) (prohibiting violating a duty of protection); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-95
I(B) (2000) (prohibiting inflicting or allowing infliction of great bodily injury against a
child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-70(A)(2) (2008) (prohibiting causing any bodily harm to be
done to the child that does or is likely to endanger the child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-80
(2008) (prohibiting causing unnecessary pain or suffering to be done against a child); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-30 (2006) (prohibiting permitting physical or sexual abuse of a
child and recognizing a domestic violence affirmative defense); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 269-1 (1993) (prohibiting contributing to abuse of child); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-401(c)(1)
(2017) (prohibiting knowingly exposing or failing to protect child from abuse); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-102(b) (2015) (prohibiting reckless conduct that results in harm to another);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-402(a) (2016) (prohibiting aggravated child abuse, neglect, and
endangerment); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a) (2017) (prohibiting causing injury to a
child through omission when the defendant has a duty of care to the child and recognizing a
very specific domestic violence affirmative defense); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041
(2007) (prohibiting endangering or abandoning child by act or omission); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-109(2) (2017) (prohibiting permitting child abuse); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1304(a)
(2017) (prohibiting exposing child to cruelty); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371 (2015)
(prohibiting causing or encouraging acts rendering a child delinquent or abused); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (2016) (prohibiting abuse of child by act or omission); WIS. STAT.
§ 948.03(4) (2015) (prohibiting failing to act to prevent bodily harm to child); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-4-403(a)(ii) (2012) (prohibiting permitting child endangerment).
81
Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare
“Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 718 (1998); Evan Stark, A
Failure to Protect: Unravelling “The Battered Mother’s Dilemma,” 27 W. ST. U. L. REV.
29, 38 (2000) (noting that “a state’s broad responsibility to protect women from assault
conflicts with the presumptive duty of parents under common law, as well as most states’
statutory laws, to provide for their children’s general welfare. In the minds of judges and
juries, it is unclear when, if ever, women’s rights to safety and autonomy supercede their
responsibilities as mothers.”); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for
Feminist Theory, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 166, 170–74, (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (describing the bad mother trope in
popular culture and literature as an introduction to a discussion of mothers committing child
abuse).
82
Between 2014 and 2015, BuzzFeed News reporter Alex Campbell wrote a series of
articles exploring how failure to protect laws operate against survivors whose children have
also been abused. In one article, he chronicles the cases of over 75 survivors who were
criminally charged with failing to protect their children and received a sentence of at least
10 years. Alex Campbell, These Mothers Were Sentenced to at Least 10 Years for Failing to
Protect Their Children from a Violent Partner, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 2, 2014, 8:51 PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/these-mothers-were-sentenced-to-at-least-10-
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In these cases, the factfinder rarely inquires into whether the survivor was
aware of the abuse or was taking steps to either mitigate the abuse or devise a plan
to leave the relationship.83 While this Article is not suggesting that battered parents
should never be held criminally accountable for choices they make regarding their
children, it is critical to recognize that survivors’ choices receive an immense
amount of scrutiny compared to those of the abusive coparent.84
Civil failure-to-protect charges may also be brought against a survivor who
stays in a violent relationship regardless of whether criminal charges are pursued.85
Often these cases are brought when a survivor is advised by a child welfare social
worker to either get a protection order or quickly leave the relationship and she fails

years-for-failin?utm_term=.otqWZ1MZg#.cjv4nlxnG [https://perma.cc/74ZR-XQBZ]; see
also Alex Campbell, Battered, Bereaved, and Behind Bars, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 2 2014,
8:00 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/how-the-law-turns-battered-womeninto-criminals?utm_term=.pkPA0zq0g#.tq55gVbg8
[https://perma.cc/A4U9-S2QG]
(describing Arlena Lindley’s history of abuse and her 45 year sentence after her boyfriend
murdered her child); Alex Campbell, Woman Sent to Prison for Failing to Protect Toddler
Is Up for Parole, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 30 2015, 4:48 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/
alexcampbell/woman-sent-to-prison-for-failing-to-protect-toddler-is-up-fo?utm_term=.su
P097e9z#.kkkyoOPo8 [https://perma.cc/Y6LF-R5YD] (continuing the previous story’s
discussion of Arlena Lindley in light of her parole hearing); Alex Campbell, How “Failure
to Protect” Laws Cost a 12-Year-Old Rape Victim His Mother, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 7,
2014, 5:26 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/mothers-imprisonment-leadsrape-victim-to-wish-he-had-never?utm_term=.nnLaE4XEq#.pxJMnqVnj [https://perma.cc
/QTQ5-EAKN] (analyzing how a victim’s mother received more prison time than did his
sexually abusive stepfather); Alex Campbell, This Battered Woman Wants to Get Out of
Prison,
BUZZFEED
News
(Nov.
11,
2014,
1:48
PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/this-battered-woman-wants-to-get-out-of-prison?
utm_term=.wvPYAZlAD#.snLJx7Nx1 [https://perma.cc/2J2D-MBCP] (again providing
details into a case where a mother received more prison time than her abusive boyfriend);
Alex Campbell, Vermont Kills Failure-to-Protect Law, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 18, 2015,
12:25 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/vermont-kills-failure-to-protectlaw?utm_term=.ui54rQErX#.ohLwzPpzX [https://perma.cc/FBU4-CKWX] (reporting on
Vermont’s House of Representatives removed a failure to protect provision from a child
abuse prevention bill and instead added a domestic violence affirmative defense to its child
endangerment law). Unsurprisingly, mothers who are not being abused are also being
prosecuted for their children’s deaths, even when they do not participate in the violence
directly. For a recent example, see Jordan Owen, Mother of Murdered Toddler Gets 7 Years
for Child Endangerment, CHI. SUN TIMES (May 9, 2016, 3:26 PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/mother-of-murdered-toddler-gets-7-years-for-childendangerment/ [https://perma.cc/MX4M-JB7B] (mother who ignored injuries inflicted by
her boyfriend while she was at work pled to two counts of felony child endangerment after
the child was murdered).
83
See Murphy, supra note 81, at 743–61; FERRARO, supra note 61, at 231–35.
84
See Roberts, supra note 77, at 110–11.
85
See Kitchen, supra note 11, at 388–89.
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to do so.86 While cases in the child welfare system cannot result in incarceration
unless a court order is violated, they nonetheless can have even more long term and
devastating consequences for a parent: the limiting or outright loss of parental
rights.87 Similar to criminal charges, failure-to-protect allegations can be made
against a parent for exposing their child to either domestic violence or child abuse.88
Although supporters of the child welfare system advocate for state intervention
as a way to ensure support for unstable families,89 critics have long demonstrated
the vast disparity in resources going toward removal rather than rehabilitation.90
More sobering still are statistics showing the unlikeliness of family reunification
once a child has been removed as well as the risk of harm children in the foster care
system face.91 For survivors, removing a child from an unsafe home neither
guarantees safety for the child nor provides the resources she needs to achieve the
stability necessary to get her child back. Moreover, a growing body of research
demonstrates that providing assistance and support to survivors is the most effective
way to keep children safe.92
Once survivors find themselves involved in the legal system—be it the civil
system, the criminal system, or both—they may find the terms of their relationships
dictated not by their own desires, realities, or calculations but by system actors
including police officers, prosecutors, and judges. Because the pervading philosophy
within the legal system is that domestic violence is best remedied by separation,93
survivors may struggle to maintain their preferred lifestyle, relationship, and control
over their safety once separated.94 A court ordered restriction to contact or come near
a partner may logistically result in either or both parties needing to reassess their
86

Lindauer, supra note 74, at 798.
Raeder, supra note 37, at 108–09.
88
Lindauer, supra note 74, at 804–05; Dunlap, supra note 75, at 566–67. While the
publicity of the Nicholson case has been somewhat persuasive in other jurisdictions
regarding not making exposure to domestic violence the sole reason for child removal, this
still remains a possibility in some states. Raeder, supra note 37, at 117–18 (noting both the
influence of Nicholson and its limitations, namely loss of custody even as parental rights are
maintained).
89
LINDA SPEARS, BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORGANIZATIONS
AND CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 3–5 (2000).
90
Raeder, supra note 37, at 121 (discussing the extreme disparity in federal funding of
child welfare systems, with most going to out of home placement as opposed to preventative
services).
91
Murphy, supra note 81, at 712; see also Lindauer, supra note 74, at 811–12
(discussing both the challenges to reunification and the dangers children are exposed to once
removed).
92
See, e.g., ANN ROSEWATER & KATHY MOORE, ADDRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
CHILD SAFETY AND WELL-BEING: COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA FAMILIES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CALIFORNIA LEADERSHIP GROUP ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND CHILD WELL-BEING 6 (2010).
93
Kohn, supra note 39, at 200.
94
See Kitchen, supra note 11, at 388–89.
87
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relationship and their living situation. For battered mothers with children, however,
needing to leave a formerly shared household may not be as simple as moving out
(which for reasons including finances, family, and the housing market, is not simple
at all). Survivors are told by the state that they cannot remain with their partners in
any meaningful way, yet they are not also being provided with either resources or
reasonable guidelines to facilitate and maintain this state imposed separation.
Survivors who choose not to leave are punished for not doing so: they may face
incarceration, suspension or termination of parental rights, or loss of custody. These
punitive responses to survivors staying in abusive relationships place further
pressure on survivors to leave the relationship lest they incur these consequences.
Leaving the relationship, however, by no means guarantees stability, safety, or
liberty, as survivors who do leave may nonetheless find themselves in violation of
parental kidnapping laws.
III. PARENTAL KIDNAPPING LAWS
It is now fairly common knowledge that it takes many survivors multiple
attempts to be able to successfully extricate themselves from the lives of their
abusive partners.95 Despite this increasingly widespread recognition, it remains
critical not to lose sight of the realities underlying these statistics. For survivors of
domestic violence, both deciding to leave and actually separating from an abusive
partner can be extremely difficult.96 There are many factors that survivors must
consider and there are myriad reasons why a survivor might rationally decide that

95
This fact is found in numerous, easily accessible, introductory discussions and
explanations of domestic violence. See, e.g., 50 Obstacles to Leaving, NATIONAL DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE HOTLINE (June 10, 2013) http://www.thehotline.org/2013/06/10/50-obstacles-toleaving-1-10/ [https://perma.cc/K868-KJDW]; Sarah LeTrent, When A Friend Won’t Walk
Away from Abuse, CNN (Jan. 10, 2013, 1:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/10/living/
friend-domestic-abuse/index.html [https://perma.cc/W4VX-VNY8]; Domestic Violence,
BUILDING FUTURES (2017), http://www.bfwc.org/domestic_violence.php [https://perma.cc/
GJK9-X9B5]. This concept gained even more traction after NFL star Ray Rice was filmed
knocking his soon-to-be wife Janay Palmer out in an elevator in 2014; see, e.g., Sarah
Kaplan, #WhyIStayed: She Saw Herself in Ray Rice’s Wife, Janay, and Tweeted About It. So
Did Thousands of Others, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/09/whyistayed-she-saw-herself-in-ray-rices-wife-janayand-tweeted-about-it-so-did-thousands-of-others/?utm_term=.b94c21428b42 [https://perma
.cc/GWP7-AWPU]; Nina Bahadur, #WhyIStayed Stories Reveal Why Domestic Violence
Survivors Can’t ‘Just Leave,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2014, 12:24 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/09/whyistayed-twitter-domestic-violence_n_579
0320.html [https://perma.cc/U9HJ-CUGD]; Kathy A. Bolten, Leaving for Good Often Takes
7 to 9 Tries, DES MOINES REGISTER (Sept. 14, 2014, 1:25 AM),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2014/09/14/domestic-abuse-leaving-good/
15621169/ [https://perma.cc/K7GW-N6YH].
96
SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 77; GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 80.
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staying in the relationship is the most strategic choice.97 When survivors do leave,
these same considerations may make it challenging—if not impossible—to remain
separated. Survivors who share children with their abusive partners, this calculus
can be even more complicated logistically, financially, and emotionally.98
Nonetheless, survivors with children who do choose to separate from and
leave—whether on their own volition or because of pressure exerted by either the
domestic violence legal response or by other state systems—must navigate their
children’s survival as well as their own against the backdrop of both separation
violence that undermines their safety and state parental kidnapping laws that
threaten their liberty.
Separation violence has long been recognized as a phenomenon that occurs
when an abusive partner forcefully reasserts control over a survivor who has
attempted to leave.99 Separation violence is common at the end of abusive
relationships and provides insight into why some survivors decide it is most strategic
to return to or stay in the relationship.100 For survivors who anticipate or have already
experienced separation violence, it may also underscore the need for ensuring a clean
break or putting distance between themselves and their partners.101
Analyzing the impact of state parental kidnapping laws on battered mothers is
especially critical given its interplay with state pressure to leave and separation
violence. The term “kidnapping” typically connotes images of children or adults
being forcefully removed from their homes and held in seclusion against their will,
97

As discussed supra note 95, the #WhyIStayed hashtag has given readers who may be
less familiar with domestic violence scholarship tremendous insight into the realities of
battered women’s lives and decisions about separating. Other mainstream articles exploring
this topic and hashtag include: Val Willingham, Why I Stayed: Tangles of Domestic Abuse,
CNN (Sept. 16, 2014, 8:43 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/health/domestic-abusewillingham/index.html [https://perma.cc/L7N3-5PNV]; Michele Hunt, Out of the Closet on
Domestic Abuse: Why I Stayed, Why I Left and Why I Choose Now to Tell My Story,
HUFFINGTONPOST (Sept. 12, 2014, 9:39 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelehunt/domestic-abuse-why-i-stayed_b_5809290.html
[https://perma.cc/9VWW-YYQ5];
Franchesca Ramsey, 14 Tweets Answer ‘Why I Stayed.’ 11 Broke My Heart, But the Last 3
Gave Me Hope, UPWORTHY (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.upworthy.com/14-tweets-answerwhy-i-stayed-11-broke-my-heart-but-the-last-3-gave-me-hope
[https://perma.cc/F46CLZAS]; Julie Lee, #WhyIStayed: Powerful Stories of Domestic Violence, USA TODAY (Sept.
10, 2014, 1:44 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/09/10/why-istayed-hashtag-twitter-ray-rice/15385027/
[https://perma.cc/JP95-9BJ3];
see
also
SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 77; Coker, supra note 37, at 1017–18; Kuennen, supra note
38, at 4–5.
98
Miccio, supra note 25, at 263; Mahoney, supra note 12, at 23; Coker, supra note 35,
at 832; Dunlap, supra note 75, at 580.
99
See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 5. See also Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or
Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE
VIOLENCE 59, 79 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mayktiuk eds., 1994).
100
See generally Mahoney, supra note 12, at 5.
101
See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110.
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often for the kidnapper’s monetary or sexual gain.102 Parental kidnapping, on the
other hand, conjures up images of bitter custody battles and vindictive parents
absconding with their children out of state or out of the country.103 In reality, parental
kidnapping laws are triggered by a much broader range of circumstances. It is not
just a disgruntled, disappointed litigant whose flagrant contempt of a court order
triggers a parental kidnapping statute. Rather, states proscribe different behaviors by
different subsets of people with different states of mind and subject them to different
punishments.104 Furthermore, some states directly address the possibility of fleeing
domestic violence by including specific exemptions to prosecution and affirmative
defenses in their statutes while others do not. Depending on where they live,
survivors with children may be caught in a serious bind in which they may be
criminally punished for both staying and leaving an abusive relationship. There is
very real potential for unfair and arbitrary outcomes based on geography, which
underscores the need for these laws to be written and implemented in ways that do
not harm parents or children fleeing from unsafe homes.
A. Required Relationships
Because states’ definitions of parental kidnapping vary greatly, the first step in
determining the applicability of a parental kidnapping law is to analyze what legal
relationships the state is requiring between the fleeing parent, the abusive parent,
and the child.105 Not all states share the same conception of parental custody. That
is, in some states, parents automatically have joint custody over a child until a court
says otherwise106 while other states’ de facto position is to deny any custody to
fathers who are unmarried.107 Biological mothers will typically have a right to
custody unless a custody or child welfare court orders otherwise. That a mother has
this right does not necessarily mean that she will fall within the scope of every
parental kidnapping law.
As scholars and advocates Catherine Klein, Leslye Orloff, and Hema
Sarangapani noted over a decade ago, parental kidnapping statutes typically fall into
three categories of applicability: statutes that only apply when a custody or visitation
102
In fact, 33 of the top 34 images that come up when searching “kidnap” on a Google
image search show people restrained by rope, duct tape, or hands and three include weapons
(on file with author). The one image that differs only depicts the bust of a man.
103
Many of the top Google images for “parental kidnapping” show custody related
images or images of children torn between two parents (on file with author).
104
See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 117 (observing that “the statutory provisions
concerning definitions of lawful custodian, the availability of statutory exceptions or
defenses, and the severity of the criminal penalty for conviction vary greatly between
states”).
105
Id.
106
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.0015 (2015).
107
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-17-20(B) (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-303
(1997).
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proceeding has already been initiated; statutes that apply regardless of the existence
of a family court case; and statutes with ambiguous applicability.108 For a survivor
living in states where parental kidnapping requires at least the initiation of a family
court case,109 a lack thereof would render her immune from parental kidnapping
charges, though the act of leaving may still be used against her in civil actions.110 It
is important to recognize the very real possibility that a survivor has already sought
help from the court system before she decides to flee. Whether through a divorce,
custody, or protection order hearing, a survivor or her abusive partner may have
sought temporary or permanent care and control over their children. Despite the
existence of such a case, a survivor who is still being battered—or feels like she or
the children are still in danger—may choose to leave rather than wait for her partner
to comply with a court order.111
In states where parental kidnapping charges can be brought regardless of the
existence of a family court case, survivors are at risk of prosecution even when they
are not in violation of a court order. In several states, only a person with “no legal
right” to custody can be charged with parental kidnapping.112 This language and
similar variations create ambiguity over whether a mother can have “no legal rights”
to custody of her biological children without a family or child welfare order denying
her custody or terminating her parental rights. Moreover, in a few states, only a
person who removes a child from a legal custodian and/or deprives a legal custodian
of a right to custody has committed parental kidnapping.113
108

See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 118–19.
These states include: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-502(a)(1) (2017);
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-304(1) (2017); Louisiana, LA. STAT. ANN.
14:45.1(A) (2017); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.350a(1) (2017); Mississippi, MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-51(1) (2017); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (2017); North
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-24 (2017); Rhode Island, 1956 R.I GEN. LAWS § 11-261.2(a) (2017); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-495(a)(1) (2017); South Dakota,
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19-9 (2017); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-303(b),(c) (2017);
Virginia, VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-49.1(A),(B) (2017); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 612-14d(a) (2017).
110
Id.; see also Part III, infra.
111
Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110. (noting that even survivors with protection orders
may still experience abuse, prompting their departure).
112
These states include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.320(a) (2017); Arizona, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302(A) (2017); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-98(a) (2017);
Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 785(1) (2017); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN., § 16-545(b)(1) (2017); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-4506(1) (2017); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 509.070(1) (2017); Nebraska, NEB. REV. ST. § 28-316(1); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 135.45(1) (2017); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23(A) (2017); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 2451(a) (2017); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-204(a) (2017).
113
These states include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-6-45(a) (2017); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5409(b) (2017); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 3-503(a) (2017);
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. § 633:4(I) (2017); and Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 891 (2017).
109
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These distinctions seriously affect survivors with children. In those states
requiring court involvement, survivors who have not engaged with the family court
system would be better able to determine their relocation without risking
prosecution. Similarly, in states like Tennessee where mothers of children born out
of wedlock are assumed to have sole custody,114 battered mothers will have more
leeway in determining how best to respond to the violence at home. In many states,
however, battered mothers’ decisionmaking may result in action prohibited by their
state’s parental kidnapping laws.
B. Prohibited Acts and Enhanced Punishments
Every state proscribes variations of a parent abducting, concealing a child, or
interfering with court ordered custody. In addition, many states provide enhanced
punishments for doing so outside the state. For survivors fleeing violence, however,
staying within states lines is not likely to outweigh the benefits of leaving if other
states offer greater access to support networks, safety, or employment
opportunities.115
Many states specifically prohibit removing a child from that state116 or include
enhanced punishments for doing so.117 In addition to actions amounting to parental

114

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-205 (determining that “[a]bsent an order of
custody to the contrary, custody of a child born out of wedlock is with the mother”).
115
See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 110.
116
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.320 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45(b)(1)(c)-(2) (2017);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-726(1)(a)(ii)&(1)(c) (2017); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(b)(5)
(2017); IND. CODE § 35-42-3-4(a)(1)&(a)(2) (2017); IOWA CODE § 710.6 (2017); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5409(b)(2)(C)-(E) (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:45(A)(4) (2017); ME.
STAT. tit. 17-a, § 303(1)(B)-(C) (2017); MD CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 9-304, 9-305 (2009);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-51 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-632 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.359 (2017) (removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court, not the state
specifically); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:4(I) (2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.50
(McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-05
(2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 891 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.257 (2017); 1956 R.I. GEN.
LAWS 11-26-1.1 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19-10 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3913-306 (2017); TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.03 (2017) (taking the child out of the judicial district
or county); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-49.1 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47(D) (2017);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.060(1)(c)–(d) (2017).
117
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-502(b)(1) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1302(E)
and 13-1305(B) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45(b)(1)(c)-(2) (2017); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-726(1)(a)(ii)&(1)(c) (2017); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(b)(5) (2017) (prohibiting
refusal to return child to Illinois after out of state visitation); IND. CODE 35-42-3-4(a)(1)–(2)
(2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-4506(2) (2017); IOWA CODE § 710.6 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-5409(b)(2)(C)-(E) (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:45(A)(4) (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A,
§ 303(1)(B)-(C) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 265, § 26A (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 973-51 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.150 and 565.153 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
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kidnapping being punishable by the survivor’s state of origin, some states also
criminalize bringing and retaining an abducted child into that new state from a
different state.118 Fleeing from one state into another may thus result in a survivor
being charged in two states for parental kidnapping.
For survivors fleeing violent relationships, considerations about where to go
are determined far more by safety, resources, and support networks than by state
boundaries. Yet in many states, they risk far greater punishment if they seek
sanctuary outside of that state. Survivors who conceal their children from the other
parent can only hope that their state provides alternate mechanisms to avoid either
arrest or conviction for intra or interstate parental kidnapping.
C. Exemptions and Defenses
Many states provide exemptions from prosecution or affirmative defenses
against conviction to defendants who quickly return their children to the other
parent. Encouraging actions that rectify the kidnaping makes sound policy sense in
situations outside of the domestic violence context. But for families experiencing
domestic abuse, these options are not useful to survivors who commit to their
separation for more than just a few days.119
632 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-303 (2017);
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14d(b) (2017).
118
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.156(1)(4) (2017); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/105(b)(9) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 26A(1)(5)
(2017). Missouri and Illinois have identical affirmative defenses for when the defendant is
fleeing domestic violence (including child abuse), whereas Minnesota only has an
affirmative defense for protecting the child.
119
In Tennessee, it is an affirmative defense to custodial interference if the defendant
voluntarily returns the child prior to the issuance of an arrest warrant. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-306(c)(2) (2017). Michigan’s child taking statute states that an adoptive or
biological parent “shall not take that child, or retain that child for more than 24 hours, with
the intent to detain or conceal the child from any other parent or legal guardian of the child
who has custody or parenting time rights under a lawful court order at the time of the taking
or retention.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.350a(1) (2017). In New Jersey, if the child is
detained, concealed, taken, or enticed for longer than 24 hours or outside of the United States,
the act is chargeable as a crime of the second degree as opposed to a crime of the third degree.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-4 (2017). In Arizona, charges of custodial interference may be
dropped from a class three felony to a class one misdemeanor if the child is voluntarily and
safely returned within 48 hours. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302(E) (2017). Idaho provides
an affirmative defense for a defendant who returns the child within 24 hours “after expiration
of an authorized visitation privilege.” IDAHO CODE § 18-4506(2) (2017). In Minnesota, a
deprivation of parental or custodial rights case must be dismissed if the child is voluntarily
returned within 48 hours or the defendant both stays in Minnesota and, within seven days of
taking the child, either the defendant or the complainant files a motion in family court. MINN.
STAT. § 609.26(5) (2017). Indiana’s interference with custody statute provides that, if a
defendant returns the child within 7 days after the violation of a court order, the judge may
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In contrast, survivors will find far greater protection in a state that provides
specific mechanisms for considering domestic violence or child abuse when
investigating or deciding parental kidnapping charges. Seventeen states specifically
include an exemption or affirmative defense for fleeing domestic violence or child
abuse in at least one of their parental kidnapping statutes,120 while fourteen only

consider this return a mitigating circumstance. IND. CODE § 35-42-3-4(c) (2017). In Texas,
it is an affirmative defense if the child is returned to the district or country where the child
was removed within three days of the offense. TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.03(c) (2017). In
Wisconsin, this time limit to return a child to another legal custodian after court ordered
parenting time or visitation is only 12 hours. WIS. STAT. § 948.31(1)(b) (2017). Maryland’s
and Washington, D.C.’s parental kidnapping laws both include provisions prohibiting a
parent who initially had lawful possession of the child to detain the child for more than 48
hours after that lawful possession ended and the lawful custodian requested the child’s return.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 9-304(2), 9-305(2) (2017); D.C. CODE § 16-1022(b)(3)
(2017). Montana’s parenting interference statute specifically states that, for an individual’s
first offense, that individual does not commit the crime if he or she does not leave the state
and returns the child before arraignment or, alternatively, does leave the state but returns the
child before arrest. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-634(3) (2017). Pennsylvania’s interference
with custody of children statute also reduces that crime from a third degree felony if the act
consisting of interference was done in good cause and for less than 24 hours, if the defendant
has been given some amount of custody or visitation through a valid Pennsylvania court
order, and the defendant both lives in Pennsylvania and did not remove the child from the
state: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2904(c)(2) (2017). See also NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra
note 3, at 20 (noting that this practice is “unlikely to provide any legal protection” to
survivors.).
120
13 states provide statutory affirmative defenses to all of their parental kidnapping
related laws for parents fleeing from either harm to the child or harm to themselves. 17 states
have at least one parental kidnapping statute with an exemption or affirmative defense for
defendants whose actions were based in either protecting themselves or protecting their
children. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302 (2017), but no defense for ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1305 (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (2017), but no defense for CAL. PENAL
CODE § 278 (2017); D.C. CODE § 16-1023 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-4506 (2017); IND.
CODE § 35-42-3-4 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 609.26(2) (2017); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.153,
565.156 (2017), but no defense for MO. REV. STAT. § 565.150 (2017); N.J. STAT.
ANN.§ 2C:13-4 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.359 (2017); 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-261.2, 11-26-1.1 (2017), separate defense for 1956 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-26-1.4 (2017), which
involves kidnapping a minor against his will; TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.03 (2017), but no
defense for TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.04 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-303 (2017); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 9A.40.060, 9A.40.070 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 948.31 (2017). Florida, Illinois,
and Pennsylvania each have at least one statute with an affirmative defense for domestic
violence and child abuse and at least one statute with only an affirmative defense for child
abuse. FLA. STAT. § 787.03 (2017) covers both but FLA. STAT. § 787.04 (2017) only covers
child abuse; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5 (2017) covers both but 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/105.5 (2017) only covers child abuse; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2909 (2017) covers both but 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2904 (2017) only covers child abuse.
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consider flight to protect the child.121 Nineteen include no specific consideration for
either domestic violence or child abuse.122 Finally, Montana’s interference and
aggravated interference with parent child contact statutes provide an exemption from
violating those laws when a defendant acts with “reasonable cause,” which may
allow for considerations of domestic violence or child abuse but does not specifically
require that they be taken into account.123
1. Protecting the Child
The states that recognize the relevance of protecting children from child abuse
in parental kidnaping cases do so in very different ways, albeit all in the form of
affirmative defenses. The largest distinctions between the affirmative defenses
involve the kind of harm to the child that satisfies the defense; the immediacy of the

121

14 states’ statutes provide affirmative defenses for protecting only the child but not
the fleeing parent. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-501 (2017) (interference with visitation—but not
interference with custody or interference with court ordered custody); COLO REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-304 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-726 (2017) (custodial interference in the first
degree—but not second degree); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:45.1 (2017) (interference with the
custody of a child—but none for simple kidnapping, which explicitly applies to parents);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 9-304, 9-305 (2017), but none for MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 3-503 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.350a (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:4
(2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.50 (2017) (custodial interference in the first degree—but not
second degree); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23 (2017) (interference with custody); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 567A(B) (2017) but none for OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 891 (2017); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 2904, 2909 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-306 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 2451 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14d (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-204 (2017). As
noted above, Illinois has one statute carving out a defense for protecting only a child, 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5.5 (2017), and one statute with a defense for fleeing domestic
violence generally, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5 (2017), which could also include a child.
Finally, Florida’s statute provides a defense for protecting a child or a parent but limits this
defense to protecting the child only if the child is taken out of state. FLA. STAT. § 787.03
(2017) (interference with custody—protecting both child and parent); FLA. STAT. § 787.04
(2017) (removing minors from state or concealing minors contrary to state agency order or
court order—protecting child).
122
AL, CT, DE, GA, IA, KS, KY, ME, MD, MA, MS, NE, NM, NC, ND, OR, SC, SD,
VA. Note that several of these states may have statutes with defenses for nonabuse related
factors like obtaining consent, returning the children, or the other parent failure to assert his
custody rights in a set amount of time.
123
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-633(1) (2017). While this exemption applies to
interference with parent child contact and aggravated interference with parent child contact
charges, it does not apply to parenting interference or custodial interference violations. These
statutes provide only an exemption for first time offenses when the child is quickly and
voluntarily returned. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-304(3), 45-5-634(3) (2017). A variation
thereof is also available as a defense under the interference with parent child contact laws.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-633(2) (2017).
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harm; and whether any steps must be taken by the survivor either before or after her
departure.
Some states’ affirmative defenses provide that the harm to the child that a
parent is fleeing from must be physical injury.124 Other states offer a broader
definition of harm, essentially allowing a parent to flee to protect a child’s safety or
welfare. 125 In these states, a survivor would be able to provide a broader range of
evidence that her child was endangered, even if that danger was not in the form of
physical injury.126
In addition to defining the harm required to invoke an affirmative defense, some
states also require that the imposition of that harm must be immediate.127 An
imminence requirement undermines a survivor’s ability to plan a strategic and
uneventful departure; rather, she must wait until the child is in actual danger before
departing.

124

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-501(c)(1) (2017), which states that it is an
affirmative defense in an interference with visitation prosecution that the defendant
committed the acts in question to “protect the minor from imminent physical harm” so long
as the defendant was reasonable in her belief that physical harm was imminent and her
withholding of visitation rights was a reasonable response to the perceived harm. This same
defense is not available for defendants being prosecuted for interference with custody.
125
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-304(3) (2017) (stating that the defendant need
only prove that she “reasonably believed that [her] conduct was necessary to preserve the
child from danger to his welfare”); see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:45.1(A) (2017) (stating that
it is a defense to Louisiana’s interference with the custody of a child statute “that the offender
reasonably believed his actions were necessary to protect the welfare of the child”); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 135.50(2) (2017) (“It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution . . . that
the taking was necessary in an emergency to protect the victim because he has been subjected
to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23(c) (2017)
(“It is an affirmative defense to a charge of enticing or taking under division (A)(1) of this
section, that the actor reasonably believed that the actor’s conduct was necessary to preserve
the child's health or safety.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.350a(7) (2017) (the defendant must
prove that “her actions were taken for the purpose of protecting the child from an immediate
and actual threat of physical or mental harm, abuse, or neglect”).
126
That is, rather than being restricted to only putting on evidence that the child was in
actual physical danger, the defendant would be able to provide more holistic evidence and
testimony about the general safety and welfare of the child being compromised, thereby
presenting a more detailed picture of the circumstances that led the parent to flee.
127
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-501(c)(1) (2017) (stating that it is an affirmative
defense in an interference with visitation prosecution that the defendant committed the acts
in question to “protect the minor from imminent physical harm”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 633:4(III) (2017) (stating that the defendant must have been “acting in good faith to protect
the child from real and imminent danger”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-306(C)(1) (2017)
(providing an affirmative defense when “the person who removed the child or incompetent
person reasonably believed that, at the time the child or incompetent was removed, the failure
to remove the child or incompetent person would have resulted in a clear and present danger
to the health, safety, or welfare of the child or incompetent person”).
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Many states also require that the defendant take certain steps to alert law
enforcement or family court judges to the child’s location.128 Some of these
requirements are extremely onerous in terms of both timing129 and what actions must
be taken.130 In these states, the defendant must not only attempt to resettle herself
and her children in a new place, search for work, enroll her children in school, and
determine childcare arrangements,131 all while looking for signs that her abusive
partner has found her—she must also consult with a lawyer in order to be made
aware of these requirements and time limits. She must further hope that, at trial, the
judge will agree with her assessment of the dangers her children faced prior to her
move.
Although these fourteen states do provide an avenue for survivors to avoid
parental kidnapping convictions when their actions have been borne out of actual or
threatened child abuse, a narrow interpretation of these defenses by the court can

128

See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 567A(B) (2017) (“The offender shall have an
affirmative defense if the offender reasonably believes that the act was necessary to preserve
the child from physical, mental, or emotional danger to the child’s welfare and the offender
notifies the local law enforcement agency nearest to the location where the custodian of the
child resides.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-204(c)(1) (2017) (providing an affirmative defense
when the defendant’s action “was necessary to preserve the child from an immediate danger
to his welfare”).
129
See, e.g., MD CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-306 (2017) (requiring a detailed petition
to be filed within 96 hours of the flight); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:4(III) (2017) (requiring
that the defendant demonstrate that she was “acting in good faith to protect the child from
real and imminent physical danger,” and noting that evidence of good faith may include “the
filing of a nonfrivolous petition documenting such danger and seeking to modify the custody
decree in a court of competent jurisdiction within this state. Such petition must be filed within
72 hours of termination of visitation rights.” While this is an example of the kind of proof
the court is looking for, both its specificity and its very short timeline indicate the challenges
of being able to access this defense during a time of transition.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 633:4(IV) (2017) (stating explicitly the defense is not available to any defendant who took
the child out of state); VT. STAT. ANN. § 2451(c) (2017) (providing a substantively identical
affirmative defense to New Hampshire law).
130
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-726(2) (2017) (requiring that a survivor invoking
the defense must have “filed a report with the clerk of the family court detailing the
whereabouts of the minor, the person who took, enticed, detained, concealed, or removed the
minor or child, and the circumstances of the event as soon as the filing of the report was
practicable; and provided further that the person asserting the affirmative defense also filed
a request for a custody order as soon as the filing of the request was practicable.” Given that
“practicable” is not defined in statute or case law, this affirmative defense requires the
defendant to have taken a series of steps that could jeopardize her safety and still not be
deemed by the court to have been undertaken quickly enough).
131
Coker, supra note 35, at 836 (“Women who separate need money for new housing—
first and last month rent plus deposit, new childcare arrangements, new school enrollment,
and a new job. Many women must make these arrangements while using inadequate and
unreliable public transportation.”).
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result in their protection being denied to survivors.132 And, despite the long
established link between abusing partners and child abuse,133 survivors whose
children have not been abused or who are unaware of their children’s abuse would
not be able to benefit from these affirmative defenses at all.134
2. Protecting the Child or the Fleeing Parent
Survivors have better chances of achieving lasting safety and independence in
states that explicitly consider the role their abuse played in their decisions and
actions. Better yet, rather than relying only on affirmative defenses at trial, several
states provide exemptions for survivors of domestic violence: rather than providing
an affirmative defense at trial, some statutes include measures that are meant to
prevent certain survivors from being arrested or prosecuted.135 For example, the
District of Columbia provides an exemption and an affirmative defense within its
parental kidnapping statute.136 Florida, however, is the only state to provide both an
exemption137 and an affirmative defense138 for defendants charged with interference
132

NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 17.
See Peter G. Jaffe, Children of Domestic Violence: Special Challenges in Custody
and Visitation Dispute Resolution, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILDREN: RESOLVING
CUSTODY AND VISITATION DISPUTES, A NATIONAL JUDICIAL CURRICULUM 19–31 (Janet
Carter et al., eds., 1995) (estimating that approximately 30% of abusive partners also abuse
their children).
134
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 22–23.
135
Id.
136
See D.C. CODE § 16-1023(a)(1)–(2) (2017) (stating that the parental kidnapping
statute does not apply to a defendant whose action “[i]s taken to protect the child from
imminent physical harm . . . [or] [i]s taken by a parent fleeing from imminent physical harm
to the parent . . . .” ). D.C. CODE § 16-1023(b)-(c) (2017) (providing that if the survivor can
convince a police officer or a prosecutor of the existence of imminent physical danger to
either herself or her child, she should be able to avoid prosecution all together. If a survivor
does violate the parental kidnapping statute, the statute provides that she can file a petition
with the court stating that a lack of action would have resulted in “clear and present danger
to the health, safety, or welfare of the child” and also attempt to obtain or modify a custody
order—if she does this within five days of the action constituting parental kidnapping and
the court finds that the child was in fact in clear and present danger, she will have a complete
defense to parental kidnapping charges. In D.C., a survivor is entitled to avoid prosecution
if she can demonstrate that she was fleeing from imminent physical harm but, if the harm
was either not physical or not imminent, she loses this opportunity. While the statute provides
a back end fix for defendants taking their children away from child abuse, this same defense
does not exist for survivors of domestic violence). See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2909(a)
(2017) (providing an exemption in the child concealment statute based on domestic violence
or child abuse). But see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2904(b)(1) (2017) (providing only an
affirmative defense in its separate interference with custody statute if the action was taken to
protect the child).
137
FLA. STAT. § 787.03(6)(b)(1)–(3) (2017).
138
FLA. STAT. § 787.03(4)(a)–(b) (2017).
133
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with custody. This statute provides both front and back end fixes for parents fleeing
from either child abuse or domestic violence. Interestingly, if the child is taken out
of Florida against a court order, the defendant can only avail an affirmative defense
regarding fleeing child abuse.139 If the survivor is choosing to both defy a court order
and leave the state, only the child’s safety is explicitly recognized as relevant.140
California,141 Rhode Island,142 Illinois,143 and Texas144 each also provide exemptions
to prosecution based on violence to the child or the mother.
According to practitioners surveyed by the NCDBW, these exemptions are
promising because “when the system works as intended, a victim is not
charged . . . . This allows survivors to remain in refuge states with their children,
pending the results of civil custody cases.”145 On the other hand, practitioners have
also reported that only some survivors have benefited from the exemptions due to

139

FLA. STAT. § 787.04(5) (2017).
This is a prime example of mothers’ identities and safety being prioritized below
both that of their children and the integrity of a court.
141
CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.7 (2017) (providing an exemption based on child abuse or
domestic violence for deprivation of custody assuming that, in either case, leaving the child
with the abusive parent would result in “immediate bodily injury or emotional harm.”); see
generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (2017) (providing an exemption for the child’s suffering,
not the mother’s, even if the mother is experiencing abuse. In addition to this inquiry, the
survivor must take several steps to avail herself of this exemption: within 10 days, she must
make a report to the original jurisdiction’s district attorney regarding her explanation for her
actions as well as her and her children’s contact info, within 30 days, she must begin a PKPA
compliant custody case, and she must continue to update the original district attorney with
changes in contact info. There are no similar exemptions or affirmative defenses for a parent
with no legal right to custody who is accused of parental kidnapping.).
142
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-26-1.2(b)(1)–(2) (2017) (protecting from prosecution
actions “taken to protect the child from imminent physical harm; . . . [or] taken by a parent
fleeing from imminent physical harm to himself or herself”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-26-1.1
(2017) (providing an affirmative defense for fleeing family violence, which includes child
abuse and domestic abuse).
143
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(b)(6) (2017) (providing a specific exemption for
concealing a child his father, who is or was married to the survivor, on account of entering
into a domestic violence program. This same statute also provides affirmative defenses for
fleeing family violence, which includes both child abuse and domestic violence). But see 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5.5(g)(1) (2017) (providing an affirmative defense related to violence
only when “a person or lawful custodian committed the act to protect the child from
imminent physical harm, provided that the defendant’s belief that there was physical harm
imminent was reasonable and that the defendant’s conduct in withholding visitation rights,
parenting time, or custody time was a reasonable response to the harm believed imminent.”).
144
TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.03(c-2)(2) (2017) (“[F]leeing the commission or attempted
commission of family violence, as defined by Section 71.004, Family Code, against the child
or the person.”); TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.04 (providing no related affirmative defenses and
no exemptions or defenses).
145
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 20.
140
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the onerous steps many require of survivors to quickly undertake without any legal
or financial assistance.146
Arizona,147 Idaho,148 Indiana,149 Minnesota,150 Missouri,151 New Jersey,152
Utah,153 Washington,154 and Wisconsin155 all provide an affirmative defense based
on acts intended to protect either the mother or the child. As with statutes that only
provide affirmative defenses for child abuse, these affirmative defenses also differ
in terms of imminence, harm, and proactive steps required to invoke them.156 Even
with these provisions, proving imminence and harm in court may still be challenging
146

NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 20; see also JOHNSTON ET AL., supra
note 6, at 5 (noting that “[d]espite California’s affirmative defense for parents who take their
children to flee violence, not all cases involving domestic violence were identified and
provided protection under this defense”).
147
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302 (2017) (requiring the defendant to file for a
protection order or custody claiming that the child is unsafe and has a good faith and
reasonable belief that the child is in immediate danger with the other parent based on either
child abuse or domestic violence); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1305 (2017) (providing no
affirmative defenses).
148
See IDAHO CODE § 18-4506(2)(a)–(b) (2017) (protecting either the child or the
parent from imminent physical harm).
149
See IND. CODE § 35-42-3-4(f) (2017) (applying when defendant was threatened or
reasonably believes that the child was threatened).
150
See MINN. STAT. § 609.26 subdiv. 2(1)–(2) (2017) (“[T]he person reasonably
believed the action taken was necessary to protect the child from physical or sexual assault
or substantial emotional harm . . . or the person reasonably believed the action taken was
necessary to protect the person taking the action from physical or sexual assault.”).
151
See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.160 (2017) (“[F]leeing an incident or pattern of domestic
violence,” which includes violence to the child or survivor); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.150
(2017) (providing no alternative defenses).
152
See N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:13-4(c) (2017) (stating that for reasonable belief of
imminent danger to the child’s welfare, requires giving notice and contact info within 24
hours to the sheriff, prosecutor, or child welfare agency of the original jurisdiction; for
reasonable belief of imminent danger toward the defendant, must quickly give notice as
above or begin a custody case).
153
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5(6)(b) (2017) (stating that a reasonable belief that the
action is necessary to protect the child from abuse). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-305(a)
(providing a more generally applicable defense when it is reasonably necessary to protect
any other person from imminent bodily harm or death).
154
See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.40.080 (2017) (“The defendant’s purpose was to
protect the child, incompetent person, or himself or herself from imminent physical harm,
that the belief in the existence of the imminent physical harm was reasonable, and that the
defendant sought the assistance of the police, sheriff’s office, protective agencies, or the
court of any state before committing the acts giving rise to the charges or within a reasonable
time thereafter . . . .”).
155
See WIS. STAT. § 948.31(4)(a)(1)–(2) (2017) (stating that one must reasonably
believe in threat of physical harm or sexual assault to child or to defendant herself).
156
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 22.
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depending on the survivor’s access to evidence. Even when a survivor may be able
to successfully invoke an affirmative defense and avoid conviction, she cannot assert
the defense until trial and must therefore experience arrest and possible pretrial
detention and separation from her children even if she prevails at trial.157
3. Using the Common Law Necessity Defense
A minority of states provide no affirmative defenses based on domestic or child
abuse in any of their parental kidnapping statutes.158 In many of the states with no
specific defenses for fleeing child abuse or domestic violence, defendants could
attempt to invoke the affirmative defense of necessity.159 Without an explicit
statutory defense, however, they may face an uphill battle in proving that the
hypothetical harm of staying in the relationship was greater than the actual harm of
depriving a parent of their right to see their child.160 Moreover, case law regarding
this defense frequently emphasizes that it may only be invoked when the defendant
had no other means to address the harm and when her illegal action was the only
“viable and reasonable” option.161 Courts may hold a defendant’s failure to involve
the police or the court system against her because of her failure to exhaust those
options before fleeing.162 Practitioners have reported that many survivors have not
been able prevail under necessity defenses.163
The very fact that twenty states do not explicitly address child abuse or
domestic violence demonstrates how the impact of domestic violence on survivors
with children has not been comprehensively integrated into criminal law. The ways
in which other states have attempted to address the interrelationship of domestic
violence and parental kidnapping further highlight how this nexus remains largely
unincorporated: protections are piecemeal and rarely recognize the intersecting
demands on survivors fleeing violence. Although a total of thirty one states and
Washington, D.C. provide some kind of protection for defendants fleeing to protect
their children, they do so with vastly different elements, requirements, and burdens

157

Id.
Parental kidnapping statutes in Alabama, Connecticut, Deleware, Georgia, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachuetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia
contain no explicit affirmative defense grounded in domestic or child abuse.
159
But see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.330(b) (2017) (providing that the affirmative defense
of necessity in a second degree custodial interference prosecution is explicitly not applicable
to a defendant who keeps a child for whichever is shorter: 24 hours or “the time necessary to
report to a peace officer or social service agency that the child or incompetent person has
been abused, neglected, or is in imminent physical danger.”).
160
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (U.L.A. 2017).
161
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 18–19.
162
Id. at 18.
163
Id.
158

290

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

of proof.164 The seventeen states that also provide protection to a defendant who is
in danger also run the gamut in terms of when the protection first applies, what must
be proved, and what action is required from the defendant. Given these disparities
and challenges in the ways that even protection for survivors are written, it is no
surprise that their application has also been ineffective.165 Survivors may not be able
to effectively invoke those protections ostensibly intended for their benefit; law
enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and juries may also be unfamiliar with both these
mechanisms and dynamics of domestic violence more broadly.166 Survivors may
struggle to access and to prevail under legal tools created for them. Involvement
with the criminal court system can create extensive and long lasting barriers for
survivors who choose to separate from their abusive partners—and these
consequences are even more severe for those survivors who are convicted of parental
kidnapping. These barriers multiply for survivors whose decisions to leave implicate
federal as well as state laws.
D. Intersection with Federal Laws
Survivors who choose to relocate out of state may experience the adverse
consequences of additional state and federal custody laws. The two most prominent
jurisdictional laws that are likely to be implicated in a survivor’s flight to a different
state are the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(“UCCJEA”)167 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”).168 The
UCCJEA itself is not a federal law: rather it is a model jurisdictional statute adopted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1997.169
As of 2016, the District of Columbia and every state except Massachusetts have
enacted state level versions of the UCCJEA.170 Massachusetts continues to operate
under the older Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”)171 which the

164

See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-4(c)(1) (2017) (requiring the child protection
affirmative defense be proved by clear and convincing evidence—the same is not explicitly
required to invoke the self protection affirmative defense but may be presumed).
165
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 24.
166
Id.
167
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 1, 9 pt. 1 U.L.A.
pp. 257–94 (1999 Supp.).
168
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2017).
169
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET—CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND
ENFORCEMENT
ACT,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Child%20Custody%20Jurisdi
ction%20and%20Enforcement%20Act [https://perma.cc/E73K-X7VQ ] (last visited Aug.
28, 2017).
170
Id.
171
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209B (2017).
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UCCJEA was created to amend.172 State level versions of the UCCJEA are
jurisdictional statutes, which means that they do not address the merits of a custody
case but rather provide a framework for state family courts to determine which state
has jurisdiction to hear and decide a custody case.173 This framework creates a
jurisdictional analysis that is consistent across the states and district that have
adopted it, and lays out three types of child custody jurisdiction: home state
jurisdiction; more appropriate forum jurisdiction; and default jurisdiction.174 The
majority of cases fall under home state jurisdiction.
A state court has home state jurisdiction when the child and a parent have lived
in that state for at least six months prior to an initial custody case being filed.175
Home state jurisdiction takes priority over other forms of jurisdiction, but a critical
aspect of the UCCJEA is its allowance for a non home state court to grant temporary
emergency jurisdiction in situations when the child in question, her sibling, or her
parent has been abused by the other parent.176 This allows a fleeing survivor to file
for custody or a modification of an existing custody order on a temporary basis
without having to return to a court in her home state.177
There is no guarantee, however, that a non home state court will grant
temporary emergency jurisdiction or that a home state will decline jurisdiction. In
either case, the survivor may be forced to return to the state she fled to litigate the
custody case.178 That means a survivor who has marshalled the physical and
emotional resources to flee an abusive relationship could be required to return to the
state she fled to litigate a custody case. Her presence back in the home state can
disrupt her attempts to rebuild her and her children’s lives and reexpose her to her
abusive partner. Although the UCCJEA provides a mechanism for fleeing survivors
to potentially receive temporary or even permanent custody orders from their new
state, choosing to initiate this process requires taking a “calculated risk” considering
the legal and nonlegal consequences that doing so may set into motion.179
172

Joan Zorza, The UCCJEA: What Is It and How Does It Affect Battered Women in
Child-Custody Disputes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 909, 909 (2000).
173
Klein et al., supra note 15, at 113.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 113–14.
177
For the new state’s temporary emergency jurisdiction to control beyond temporary
orders, a court in the original state must decline jurisdiction: the UCCJEA provides several
rationales for denial of jurisdiction that take the survivor’s domestic violence and safety into
account. Klein et al., supra note 15, at 114. See also Zorza, supra note 172, at 917–18 (noting
the distinctions in process for when a custody case has or has not already been filed in the
state from which the survivor fled).
178
See Leigh Goodmark, Going Underground: The Ethics of Advising a Battered
Woman Fleeing an Abusive Relationship, 75 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1005 (2007) (noting the
possibility that the survivor may be forced to reveal her location in the course of the custody
litigation).
179
See Zorza, supra note 172, at 920.
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A survivor may also be subject to the PKPA.180 The PKPA is a federal law that
requires every state and tribal land grant full faith and credit to custody orders issued
in other states and tribal lands so long as the order meets due process requirements
and jurisdictional mandates laid out in the law.181 The PKPA was enacted “to
discourage interstate conflicts over custody, deter interstate abductions, and promote
cooperation between states about interstate custody matters.”182 As such, courts must
defer to the PKPA when deciding whether to enforce a custody order from another
court or tribe when considering exercising jurisdiction despite the existence of a
pending custody matter in another state, or when determining whether to modify an
existing order from another jurisdiction.183
Although the PKPA is not a criminal statute, its relationship to the federal
Fugitive Felon Act (“FFA”) may expose survivors to being detained on federal
warrants and extradited back to their original jurisdiction.184 In all of the many states
where parental kidnapping out of state is a felony, out of state flight can trigger this
law addressing interstate flight to avoid prosecution or testimony.185 The FFA allows
federal agents to issue warrants for individuals who have committed felonies and
fled across state lines, and to extradite that individual back to the original state when
located.186 FBI agents have been known to track individuals to domestic violence
shelters, resulting in their return to the state from which they fled.187
Because there is no tool for screening victims of domestic violence out of this
process, survivors who flee the state are at risk of detention, extradition, and further
abuse—as are their children, who are often returned to the abusive parent.188 In
conjunction with the unpredictable and often harsh consequences of the state
parental kidnapping laws themselves, federal laws implicated by fleeing survivors
create additional challenges and potential for harm.
IV. RISKS OF LEAVING
Regardless of whether survivors are aware of the existence or the consequences
of parental kidnapping laws, many choose to not just separate from their abusive
partners but to take the children and flee, undermining the abusive parents’
relationships with their children. Whether survivors, for example, enter a shelter,
move in with family or friends across town, or leave the state or country entirely,
they are at risk of having their abusive coparent call the police to file charges against
them. Even if survivors can get the charges dropped or succeed on an affirmative
180

See Goodmark, supra note 178, at 1004; NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3,
at 10; Klein et al., supra note 15, at 116.
181
See Zorza, supra note 172, at 912.
182
Klein et al., supra note 15, at 116.
183
See Klein et al., supra note 15, at 116.
184
See id.; Goodmark, supra note 178, at 1004.
185
See 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2012).
186
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 3, at 9–10.
187
Id. at 10 (citing the Clearinghouse’s own practitioner survey from 2003).
188
Id. at 11.
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defense, the act and fact of the arrest can have far reaching consequences. For
survivors who are not able to meet the burden of proving an affirmative defense at
trial—whether statutory or common law—conviction and incarceration, in addition
to arrest, can wreak havoc on their lives moving forward.
A. Criminal Exposure
If the survivor’s abusive coparent alerts the police of their absence and an arrest
warrant is issued or if law enforcement encounters the fleeing family otherwise, the
survivor may be arrested. The potential consequences of an arrest, even if there is
ultimately no conviction, may include violence at the hands of law enforcement; the
collateral consequences of an arrest record; and the children being taken into the
child welfare system or, perhaps even more detrimental, being returned to the
abusive parent.
1. Arrest
Violence and mistreatment by law enforcement against potential suspects and
even nonsuspects has recently become a well known and well documented
phenomenon.189 Although far too many men—especially black men—are being
killed by police, women—especially black women—are also being murdered and
assaulted in indefensibly high numbers and are receiving far less media attention.190
189

For an incredibly detailed daily log documenting local incidents of police
misconduct, see CATO INSTITUTE, NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT
(2017) http://www.policemisconduct.net/ [https://perma.cc/98T7-WXSB].
190
See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, Aren’t More White People than Black People Killed by
Police? Yes, But No, WASH. POST (July 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-nation/wp/2016/07/11/arent-more-white-people-than-black-people-killed-by-policeyes-but-no/?utm_term=.aedb7c01d3dd [https://perma.cc/4YEN-56K8] (both providing an
analysis that the rates of black people shot by police is significantly higher than that of white
people and also failing to include any discussion about specific female victims among the
discussion of several male victims); Linda Sheryl Greene, Before and After Michael Brown—
Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 13–15
(2015) (discussing the racialized nature of law enforcement violence against individuals).
See also Julia Craven, Koryn Gaines, A 23-Year Old Mother, Latest Black Woman Killed by
Police, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2016, 3:13 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/korryn-gaines-shooting_us_57a0cfbfe4b08a8e8b5f9fd4
[https://perma.cc/A8ZE-4SZV]
(describing the recent killing of Korryn Gaines and noting that 2016 is on pace to see more
black women killed by police than 2016); Zoe Carpenter, The Police Violence We Aren’t
Talking About, THE NATION (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/policeviolence-we-arent-talking-about/ [https://perma.cc/2QTE-NJPB]. See also Erick A. Paulino,
Deconstructing the Arrest of Sandra Bland, THE FEMINIST WIRE (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://www.thefeministwire.com/2015/08/deconstructing-the-arrest-of-sandra-bland/
[https://perma.cc/3T44-ZQ4U] (arguing that “in challenging racial profiling and police
brutality against people of color, #BlackLivesMatter activism must pay particular attention
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Short of being murdered, women experience other forms of violence, mistreatment,
and abuse of authority at the hands of police officers—especially women of color,191
women who transgress social and gender norms,192 and women who do not
automatically and respectfully submit to police authority.193 From the potential for
physical194 or sexual violence195 to the discomfort and humiliation of the arrest
itself,196 this process can traumatize a survivor197 and remind her all too clearly of
the abuse she is attempting to leave behind. If the arrest takes place in front of the
to how police exercise force differently for men and women, as well as for LGBT+ people,
especially transgender individuals and others whom are variously gender non-conforming.”);
Chaedria Labouvier, How Many Viral Videos Will It Take? Another Reminder of the
Vulnerability of the Black Girl in America, ELLE (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.elle.com/
culture/career-politics/a31527/do-we-need-another-video-to-remind-us-that-black-girls-arethe-most-vulnerable/ [https://perma.cc/4LQ4-M93E] (asking “[d]o we need more videos of
black girls dragged across school floors and front lawns to know that this is how black
women are treated when they have the misfortune of encountering the police and the white
male rage that so often seems part and parcel of the job?”). But see Homa Khaleeli,
#SayHerName: Why Kimberlé Crenshaw Is Fighting for Forgotten Women, THE GUARDIAN
(May 30, 2016, 10:02 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/may/30/sayher
name-why-kimberle-crenshaw-is-fighting-for-forgotten-women [https://perma.cc/NZK98XMB] (describing law professor, scholar, and activist Kimberlé Crenshaw’s campaign to
raise awareness about women killed by the police).
191
See generally ANANNYA BHATTACHARJEE, WHOSE SAFETY? WOMEN OF COLOR
AND THE VIOLENCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2001) (discussing and documenting violence
against women of color by law enforcement in both the criminal and immigration contexts).
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See Richie, supra note 37, at 143.
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See Osthoff, supra note 35, at 1533; SUSAN L. MILLER, VICTIMS AS OFFENDERS:
THE PARADOX OF WOMEN’S VIOLENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS 27–28 (2005).
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MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (2017)
(examining both historical trends of police brutality against women of color and recent
examples of women of color murdered by police).
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Carpenter, supra note 190; Steven Yoder, Officers Who Rape: The Police Brutality Chiefs
Ignore,
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(Jan.
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2016,
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http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/1/19/sexual-violence-the-brutality-that-policechiefs-ignore.html [https://perma.cc/V5KJ-L7YL]; Kim Kelly, When Police Officers Rape,
AL JAZEERA: OPINION (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/nypdrape-cases-171030110833155.html [https://perma.cc/2HVP-GTQG].
196
See Simiao Li et al., Women’s Perspectives on the Context of Violence and Role of
Police in Their Intimate Partner Violence Arrest Experiences, 30 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 400, 412–13 (2015) (regarding survivors’ arrests in the domestic violence context,
describing the negative consequences of an arrest, including humiliation, job loss, legal
consequences, and loss of confidence in law enforcement).
197
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BATTERED, BLACK WOMEN 6 (1996) (noting that the women she interviewed described being
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survivor’s children, the children also run the risk of being not only traumatized
themselves, but also taken into the custody of the child welfare system while their
mother is detained.198 Once in the child welfare system, the children will either be
placed with a relative (including the abusive parent the family was fleeing) or into
foster care. 199 If the nonabusive parent does have some form of custody of the
children, it is probable that they will be returned to that parent.
Although not nearly as far reaching as those that follow a conviction, even an
arrest may generate informal collateral consequences. For example, depending on
how long someone is detained, she may miss a job interview and no longer be in
consideration, miss work and be fired, or miss other critical appointments. Her
mugshot may be publicly available on the internet and may show up on background
checks done by potential or current employers.200 If she is on probation, parole, or
supervised release, an arrest may cause her to miss a mandated meeting; moreover,
a new arrest (even without a conviction) is enough to form the basis of a supervision
revocation and send her back to jail or prison. If she is undocumented and her status
is reported to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, her arrest may also trigger
deportation proceedings if she has already been ordered to leave the United States.
These ramifications intensify if the survivor is convicted of parental kidnapping or
custodial interference.
2. Conviction and Incarceration
In addition to arrest, being detained pretrial or incarcerated postconviction—
even briefly—can intensely impact survivors. Once incarcerated, a woman has little
to no independence or freedom; she has no agency and has to rely on others’
permission or generosity to meet even her most basic needs.201 It is not unusual for
female prisoners to feel isolated, alienated, and afraid.202 Women’s jails and prisons
are also the site of a great deal of violence at the hands of corrections officers, fellow
prisoners, and themselves.203 Although the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003204
was enacted to end sexual harassment and assault of prisoners, female prisoners are
still assaulted and abused by prison staff. For survivors fleeing violence, being
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See CLARE M. NOLAN, CHILDREN OF ARRESTED PARENTS: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE
THEIR SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 8 (2003); Raeder, supra note 37, at 119.
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See BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 191, at 44.
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Florida’s Sunshine Law Too Bright?, 66 FLA. L. REV. 913, 949 (2014).
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See RICHIE, supra note 197, at 8.
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See id. at 7.
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2005).
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incarcerated can aggravate past trauma and replicate survivors’ past abuse.205
Unfortunately, most women’s jails and prisons lack the trauma informed therapeutic
programming that could help prisoners develop healthy coping mechanisms.206
Medical units are also underequipped and hard to access for treatment of preexisting
or newly developed physical and mental health problems.207 Finally, most states
have fewer women’s jails and prisons, which means that, for many women, they will
be incarcerated far from their homes.208 This distance can make it more challenging
for female prisoners to keep in touch with their families or see their children.209
When a survivor finishes her sentence for parental kidnapping, which can range
from a few days to several years, she may find that her conviction ushers in a host
of collateral consequences. Collateral consequences are restrictions and limitations
that flow from the existence of a person’s criminal conviction.210 Beginning in the
1980s, Congress and state legislatures passed measures limiting returning citizens’
eligibility for welfare and food stamps, public housing, driver’s licenses,
employment licenses, and student loans.211 Limitations on employment, parenting,
and voting rights were also enacted and expanded.212 Each restriction is detrimental
in its own right but the consequences of their combination are devastating.213 For a
reentering survivor trying to reunite with her children, policies that limit access to
cash benefits or subsidized housing will severely undermine her ability to achieve
205

See BHATTACHARJEE, supra note 191, at 37; see also Angela Davis, The Color of
Violence Against Women, COLORLINES 4 (Oct. 10, 2000, 12:00 PM),
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WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT 3 (2006).
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208
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Incarceration, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161, 178 (2012).
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(Ruth T. Zaplin ed., 2d ed. 2008) (1998); Naomi R. Cahn, Battered Women, Child
Maltreatment, Prison, and Poverty: Issues for Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 355, 359 (2002).
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PRISONER REENTRY 63–64 (2005).
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See id. at 8.
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her goals.214 For survivors whose children were put into foster care upon her
incarceration, federal laws focused on permanency and adoption may undermine or
completely negate these efforts at family unification.215 For reentering survivors and
all returning citizens, collateral consequences make it extremely challenging to
successfully reintegrate into society after incarceration.216
Survivors coming home from jail or prison, especially those who are on some
form of probation, parole, or supervised release, also face another gender specific
challenge: a heightened vulnerability to domestic violence.217 Because of the
extensive obligations placed on them by the terms of their community supervision,
combined with the restrictions of formal collateral consequences and the informal
challenges inherent in reconnecting with family and friends, reentering survivors
may find themselves relying heavily on their abusive partners to stay afloat.218 This
confluence of factors may render it extremely challenging to leave, should the abuse
begin again, and nearly impossible to do so with children, especially if they are
living with or in the custody of the abusive partner. As such, some abusive partners,
aware of the even greater power differential, may take advantage of or trade on the
control they have over their partners while the survivors find themselves even less
able to seek help or gain independence.219
B. Civil Consequences
Survivors with arrest records face immense scrutiny and disbelief from judges
hearing their custody cases, even when they present evidence regarding domestic
violence.220 Even if the survivor is not arrested or convicted of parental kidnapping,
deciding to flee with children can have legal consequences outside of the criminal
justice realm, most notably in the custody context. If the survivor flees in the absence
of a preexisting custody order, her abusive partner may seek and obtain a custody
214

See Raeder, supra note 37, at 107. For a discussion of the federal policies, see
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See Cahn, supra note 209, at 364–65 (discussing the federal Adoption and Safe
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See LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 211, at 8–9; see also MARC MAUR & VIRGINIA
MCCALMONT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A LIFETIME OF PUNISHMENT: THE IMPACT OF THE
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order in her absence that grants the abusive partner both potentially extensive time
with, or even custody of, the child, which itself often also requires contact with the
survivor.221 If the nonfleeing parent is the first to obtain a court order, a survivor
who flees out of state is bound to encounter challenges to obtaining custody based
on the UCCJEA, which provides state courts a framework for deciding when to
accept or reject jurisdiction over a child custody case based on analysis of the child’s
home state.222
If the survivor flees with her child and a custody order is already in place, the
survivor risks not only having the terms severely modified in her absence but also
being held in contempt of court.223 Because family courts place such a high priority
on coparenting and rarely deny one parent access to a child entirely, a survivor’s
decision to circumvent the legal process for determining custody will make her look
like a recalcitrant and uncooperative parent.224 As such, in a custody or modification
proceeding, she is less likely to fare well under a best interest analysis which
considers a parent’s willingness to coparent.225 Further, if a temporary or final order
is in place, a survivor who flees with her children risks violating that order and being
punished not just by unfavorable custody provisions but also by being held in
contempt of court.226 Contempt of a court order can be punishable by both fines and
incarceration. A survivor may face jail time for violating a court custody order
especially—but not exclusively—if she has already been convicted of parental
kidnapping by a criminal court.
Considering all the challenges that can spring from committing acts
constituting parental kidnapping or custodial interference, a survivor may decide to
flee without her children. In this case, however, a court may interpret this choice not
as a compromise to protect herself without disrupting her children but as
abandonment of the child or as an indicator that she is not willing or able to protect,
provide, or care for her children.227 The survivor thus still risks being cut off from
her children in the family court setting. Given the massive risks, challenges, and
legal consequences of fleeing domestic violence with her children, a survivor may
rationally decide that the most reasonable decision is to stay in the relationship.
221
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222
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Examining the criminal, civil, and nonlegal consequences a battered mother
may encounter while navigating an abusive relationship sheds light on both the role
the state plays in pressuring survivors to separate and the power that courts have to
punish survivors who do not respond to their abuse in a state sanctioned manner.
Along with calling the police and initiating criminal actions and federal warrants, a
survivor’s abusive partner is also able to punish her for leaving through the civil
legal system by triggering child welfare investigations and by filing for, or moving
to modify, child custody orders based on her departure with the children. In addition
to undermining survivors’ agency, liberty, and safety, children are also at risk:
whether children are returned to their abusive parent or placed in the foster care
system, their physical, psychological, and emotional health and development may
be endangered. In such circumstances, it is critical to weigh the potential benefits
and harms of these placements against those inherent in remaining with the abused
survivor.
To combat these undesirable and often dangerous outcomes, domestic violence
activists and scholars should provide legal system actors with a more comprehensive
understanding of the relationship between criminal and civil systems; advocate for
state governments to reform laws and policies that negatively affect survivors of
violence and their families; and encourage society to shift the scrutiny and blame
currently reserved for survivors onto batterers instead. There are no doubt myriad
ways to work toward these goals. This Article, however, focuses explicitly on a
nonexhaustive set of recommendations to ameliorate the challenges faced by
survivors fleeing violence with their children: namely, increased awareness of the
impact of parental kidnapping statutes among lawyers working with survivors;
thoughtful reform of parental kidnapping laws; and a broader recognition by the
domestic violence movement of the cost of state involvement in survivors’ lives.
A. Best Practices for Attorneys
Attorneys working with survivors of domestic violence are likely to encounter
legal issues outside of the protection order sphere. Many domestic violence attorneys
are also well versed in family law. It is important for these attorneys to have a
breadth of family law knowledge beyond the custody and divorce statutes and
practices in their jurisdiction.228 Knowledge of federal statutes, especially the
UCCJEA, the older UCCJA, and the PKPA is critical.229 Law professor Catherine
Klein and her colleagues advise that attorneys working with survivors contemplating
leaving the state be familiar with a host of intersecting family, criminal, and
immigration laws and policies in both the new state and the future state.230
228
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While this advice has been explicitly given to attorneys whose clients are
considering fleeing the state,231 most of it also applies for attorneys of survivors who
are separating from abusive partners without leaving the state. Any time an attorney
is working with a survivor prior to or during a separation and children are involved,
the attorney should consult her state’s parental kidnapping statute to determine
whether her client could be at risk and whether she should counsel her client around
potential remedial measures that the client could take to strengthen her position,
including filing for custody or alerting authorities to her and her children’s current
location.232
Criminal defense attorneys may also find themselves working with fleeing
survivors if parental kidnapping charges are filed. While jurisdictional statutes may
be less critical to the criminal case itself, survivor-defendants may be unaware of the
options or restrictions that these statutes impose on them and would greatly benefit
from comprehensive counseling that addresses all their goals, needs, and questions.
Many survivors may not interact with an attorney until they are charged or even
arraigned with parental kidnapping. As such, a broader understanding of the systems
impacting fleeing survivors would be extremely valuable for clients.233 Given that
public defenders typically carry very large caseloads that include a large variety of
charges and may not include very many female clients, expertise in this specific area
may well prove untenable. Developing a strong relationship with a civil legal
services provider as both a resource and a source for narrowly tailored referrals
would allow public defenders to serve their clients more holistically.
Although the interrelationship between criminal charges and immigration
consequences has appropriately received much attention,234 it is similarly important
to clients that defense attorneys be able to articulate how guilty pleas or convictions
may impact a client’s custody determination or parental rights.235 Although a guilty
plea to a misdemeanor with a sentence of time served or probation may be appealing,
231
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especially to a mother who has been separated from her children, even a low level
conviction for custodial interference can result in a denial of custody or a termination
of parental rights.236
B. Amending State Laws and Policies
In addition to advocating for more effective client representation on an
individual level, fleeing survivors would benefit greatly from thoughtful reform of
parental kidnapping statutes. It is important to remember, however, that
improvements to individual statutes are made against the backdrop of our flawed
criminal justice system. As law professor Aya Gruber powerfully articulated in the
related context of reforming mandatory domestic violence criminal polices,
I see problems with any kind of criminal enforcement in the absence of
widespread social changes. Even “progressive” criminal reforms rest on
the assumption that proper education of state actors will enable the
criminal system to empower rather than subordinate minorities. I am
skeptical of this possibility and hold the suspicious belief that, however
well-intentioned, most criminal law reforms end up becoming yet another
procedural vehicle for warehousing the worst off.237
It nonetheless does seem worthwhile to consider what kinds of short term
changes might prevent survivors from falling too easily within the ambit of parental
kidnapping laws. There are three reforms which could greatly improve outcomes for
survivors, two of which are directly related to amending the statutes themselves; the
third is a more broadly applicable systemic change.
First, domestic violence advocates and activists should support and lobby for
the adoption of accessible exemptions to parental kidnapping statutes in every
state.238 Every state’s statute should provide an exemption for survivors fleeing
either child abuse or domestic violence so that survivors can avoid criminal charges.
These exemptions should be straightforward and should not impose onerous
requirements to invoke their protection. Such an exemption might read: “No one
with a right to custody commits this offense if their actions were taken based on a
good faith belief that a failure to act would endanger their or the child’s safety or
welfare.”
Another benefit to adopting exemptions such as this would be that the burden
of proof would fall on the prosecutor and not the defendant at trial. Rather than the
defendant having to meet the burden of proving that she was fleeing from violence,
the prosecutor would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was not, to
make out all the elements of the crime.
236
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Second, state legislatures should amend their parental kidnapping statutes to
require malicious intent to deprive the coparent of access to the child. Survivors
fleeing from abuse would not typically meet this requirement. This amendment
would benefit survivors without explicitly referencing domestic violence or
appearing political. Both statutory changes would also benefit immigrant survivors
in ways that adding an affirmative defense would not. If an immigrant survivor
prevailed at trial by successfully invoking an affirmative defense, she might still be
risking deportation if the prosecutor proved all the elements of the offense. These
amendments would modify the elements of the offense itself, thus making it less
likely that a survivor might be acquitted yet also placed into removal proceedings.
Finally, and more broadly, states should expand their use of alternatives to
incarceration for survivors convicted of parental kidnapping.239 The argument for
implementing viable alternatives to incarceration in the parental kidnapping context
is compelling because it would reduce the state’s infliction of trauma on survivors
and children who have experienced violence directly, indirectly, or both. Some
alternatives to incarceration that would keep nonabusive parents with their children
include home confinement and electronic monitoring, community service, fines, and
mandated mental health or drug treatment.240 While each of these options could pose
serious challenges to homeless, low income, or working survivors, they should
nonetheless be considered and employed when possible.
The use of alternatives to incarceration will benefit survivors whose
incarceration may put them at risk of having their relationships with their children
severed or their parental rights terminated.241 It would also benefit their children by
granting them the stability of remaining with their nonabusive parent instead of
having to stay with any combination of the abusive parent, relatives, friends, or
foster parents.242 Scholars have also argued that children are more adversely affected
when their mother is incarcerated than when their father is243 due in part to the loss
of their primary caretaker.244 Moreover, the effects of parental incarceration are
239
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extensive and can severely impact children’s health, development, and behavior in
both the short and long term.245 Imposing alternatives to incarceration can promote
both individual and familial health and stability while also decreasing the costs of
incarceration, foster care placement, and the collateral consequences of both on
survivors, their children, and their communities.
C. Recommendations for the Domestic Violence Movement
Finally, domestic violence advocates, activists, and scholars should also push
for the mainstream domestic violence movement246 to embrace an intersectional
understanding of the role the state plays in the lives of survivors and their families—
including their abusive partners’ lives.247 First, the movement should encourage an
issues/women/news/2013/03/08/55787/rethinking-how-to-address-the-growing-femaleprison-population/ [https://perma.cc/XF8X-UEHK].
245
TRAVIS, supra note 210, at 138–42; see also Chieko M. Clarke, Maternal Justice
Restored: Redressing the Ramifications of Mandatory Sentencing Minimums on Women and
Their Children, 50 HOWARD L.J. 263, 273 (2006).
246
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providers, and various offices and agencies within law enforcement. For more information
on the transformation of the movement from a grassroots coalition to a professional industry,
see Cross, supra note 217, at 87–102. Because the contemporary domestic violence
movement is nebulous in terms of membership, leadership, and cohesive values, the author
does not use the term to refer to an entity or explicit coalition but rather to collectively
describe individuals engaged in domestic violence and sexual assault advocacy and reform.
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expansive view of the legal system over the current landscape of silohed
specialization and narrow expertise. The movement should advocate for more and
better trainings on how different aspects of the law interact, in addition to making
these trainings available to a broad array of attorneys, judges, law enforcement, and
nonlegal actors who may encounter survivors with potential or actual legal
involvement.
The movement should also advocate for resources and services with the
potential to prevent the precipitating events that lead survivors to flee. Because many
survivors flee after a custody order is in place,248 the movement should also consider
how to help survivors and their children obtain and abide by appropriate custody
orders. Because court appointed guardians ad litem and family investigators play
such a large role in providing information and making recommendations to the court,
the movement should place a heavy emphasis on training these individuals—
especially given widespread complaints regarding some third parties’ propensity to
recommend unsafe forms of custody to abusive litigants.249 Another suggestion for
the movement is to support free or low cost supervised visitation centers where
parents could visit with their children yet could not abuse or kidnap them.250 The
availability of these centers would help mitigate survivors’ real fears regarding
treatment of themselves and their children, which could ameliorate some survivors’
desire to flee. This support is especially critical given recent trends that have seen
many of these centers close or decrease hours and staff due to cuts in funding.251
Additionally, the movement should adopt a larger framework of
antioppression—opposing and subverting not only those systems that subordinate
survivors of violence but also those that oppress marginalized individuals and
communities more broadly.252 Such a shift would require a reexamination of laws
and policies that dictate how survivors respond to domestic violence as well as
recognition that making financial resources and social services available to survivors
248
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and their communities may prove more transformative than any legal intervention.253
For survivors with children in violent relationships, this shift in focus would
translate into increased agency in deciding how to respond to the abuse, expanded
preventative and remedial services with minimal risk of undesired state intervention,
and the option of engaging with a legal system that is no longer premised on outdated
stereotypes of good mothers and worthy victims. For survivors who choose not to
leave their abusive partners, it may also consist of providing services and resources
to both individuals in the relationship to promote stability and safety.254
VI. CONCLUSION
Parents experiencing domestic violence are caught in a double bind: civil and
criminal court systems place immense pressure on survivors to leave abusive
relationships, yet leaving in a manner that is not state sanctioned may jeopardize
their safety, liberty, and relationships with their children. Survivors who do not
comply with this pressure to separate may lose custody or even parental rights,
potentially resulting in their children residing with the abusive parent or entering the
foster care system. Choosing to leave the relationship, however, may usher in a host
of logistical and legal challenges as well, which also include loss of custody or
parental rights as well as incurring criminal charges.
Remedies for this catch 22 must include—but not be limited to—suggestions
for statutory amendments. In addition to legislative action, change must be made
more broadly. Civil and criminal attorneys representing survivors in related matters
must be able to recognize the signs and impact of domestic violence and argue their
relevance in court. Police, prosecutors, and judges must also develop a more nuanced
understanding of domestic violence dynamics and how their own involvement and
interventions may intersect and interact with the abuse. Finally, the domestic
violence movement must not only remain committed to the trainings and
consciousness raising necessary to impart this awareness to legal actors. It must also
advocate for conditions that would prevent the need to flee with children, ranging
from repealing policies that undermine survivors’ agency to funding supportive
services for both survivors and abusive partners. Such wide ranging advocacy would
necessitate coalition building outside of the victims’ rights movement and would
illuminate often overlooked commonalities between the domestic violence
movement and the criminal justice reform movement.
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